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Inherent Underlying Motives in Finance

Let’s spend some time discussing inherent underlying motives in the financial industry. As I implied in the last post, this cannot be stressed enough.

I have addressed the topic many times throughout this blog. One that comes to mind is here. I discussed “Karen the Supertrader” here and here. I’ve touched on related subjects here, here, and here.

Let’s go back to the fifth paragraph of my last post:

      > We can read articles, blog posts, watch CNBC interviews by “industry insiders,”
      > and potentially talk to industry representatives ourselves [e.g. IARs, quants
      > we meet at dinner parties, or principals of financial firms that we casually
      > encounter (how?)], but most of these people cannot escape inherent conflicts
      > of interest. We are left to choose whether or not to believe

An inherent conflict of interest exists when someone has something to sell. IARs may sell us on their firms. Quants may solicit investment in their funds, subscription to their services, or purchase of black box systems. Principals may become our paid money managers. The more practiced, knowledgeable, experienced, and successful they seem, the more likely they are to profit from us. Even if we are not the target clients, they may profit if we refer them to someone who is (i.e. networking).

It’s always possible that a conflict of interest renders someone unbelievable because it provides motive to deceive for [direct or indirect] personal gain.

As a deep refresher, recall this post. Everything financial that we read, we see, and we hear must be critically evaluated. If we don’t work hard to avoid chicanery, then hard-earned capital has a good chance of landing in someone else’s pocket to our own detriment. This is not a certainty, but it happens far too often to demand anything less than our closest attention. It takes just one lapse of judgment to suffer losses and permanent impairment to our ability to ever trust a financial professional again. If we have the drive and time to learn for ourselves then problem solved! Otherwise, we may be in a bind if deep-seated distrust prevents us from ever again going forth to access valuable services provided by ethical financial professionals.

      > (and to what extent). While I do believe select individuals have a bead on
      > the truth, that’s not me and I’m not afraid to admit that to myself or to you.

If I worked for a financial firm then I may have direct knowledge of how firm assets were managed. That may be typical of other firms. If typical, then I could truly be said to know these things (and if not then I may be unknowingly misinformed). I have only traded personal capital to date. With no bona fide industry experience, I won’t pretend to know smart money financial truths about how (or if) the industry manages assets successfully. Most people, like me, have no experience working in the financial industry. Lots of people have spoken to people with conflicts of interest who are disqualified as objective sources of information.

If you are one with industry experience, then you can believe yourself. Because we may not be able to take credibility much farther than that, it is essential that we conduct due diligence with the awareness of what we cannot possibly know (regardless of how much it may seem to the contrary).

My Perspective on Algorithmic Trading (Part 1)

Where oh where should I possibly begin when it comes to algorithmic trading?

Let’s start with a definition. Wikipedia says algorithmic trading is:

      > A method of executing orders using automated pre-programmed trading
      > instructions accounting for variables such as time, price, and volume.

High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is a subset of algorithmic trading. More specifically, HFT is characterized by high speed, co-location, and frequent trading (high turnover). Co-location means trading computers are housed on the same premises as exchange servers to minimize delays and get the best execution (prices). HFT [presumably] uses complex algorithms and [presumably] sophisticated tools to trade.

I say “presumably” because I am unable to directly verify this. You probably can’t, either. We can read articles, blog posts, watch CNBC interviews by “industry insiders,” and potentially talk to industry representatives ourselves [e.g. IARs, quants we meet at dinner parties, or principals of financial firms that we casually encounter (how?)], but most of these people cannot escape inherent conflicts of interest. We are left to choose whether or not to believe (and to what extent). While I do believe select individuals have a bead on the truth, that’s not me and I’m not afraid to admit that to myself or to you. I’ll get back to this in another post because it really never gets old and is always applicable in the world of Finance (lest you doubt, watch more American Greed).

I don’t want to approach anything when it comes to investing or trading without having my critical analysis faculties (i.e. bullshit detector) at the ready. Remember the original post on optionScam.com?

For me, algorithmic trading carries two main implications. First, trading strategies can be programmed and executed by computer. This can free me up to do a multitude of other activities. Second, algorithmic trading takes the emotional component out of the equation. Fear and greed can lead to overtrading or failing to take trades. Algorithmic trading takes trades every single time they’re supposed to be taken.

These implications are not without some very important caveats, and I will begin discussion of these in the next post.

My Journey (2019 Update)

My focus has definitely shifted since I took a break from blogging.

2018 was first the losing year since I started trading full-time 11 years ago. That was certainly a wake-up call. I decided my trading approach was too risky to be doing with more than a limited portion of the account (akin to what I discussed in the second paragraph here). As a result, I have traded a small position size all year. While I have been profitable, I have significantly underperformed the benchmark.

My focus has gradually turned toward incorporating other asset classes in addition to equity options. I hope such diversification can increase total returns more than drawdown thereby improving my risk-adjusted return.

One way to accomplish this is to trade a basket of long uncorrelated futures. In other posts, I will detail my reasoning and plan for this strategy. Said discussion also begs for some space devoted to the concept and implications of correlation.

Another way to trade multiple asset classes is to develop multiple trading strategies. I will delve into this next time.

Been a Long Time!

Welcome back!

I’m actually saying that to myself because from your perspective, nothing may be different. Truth be told, however, I took a relatively long (for me, anyway) hiatus from blogging.

Worry not, though: this has happened before!

It happened here.

It happened here.

It happened here.

It’s now happened again.

But as I say with the omnipresent COVID-19, which now dominates the headlines and the structure of our everyday lives, we will get through this. I will ease back into my writing, which should help me go faster. I will relearn WordPress (and perhaps even update). I will relearn what HTML I need to manage the behind-the-scenes formatting of these posts.

And hopefully, I will bring you much more in the way of useful content. I certainly have been doing some interesting stuff, and I would love to be able to bring some of that to you.

Stay safe out there!

James Cordier: Tragedy or Laughingstock? (Part 3)

Speaking of mass deception, as I did regarding James Cordier and Optionsellers.com, I found a December 2018 press release from a legal firm that states:

     > Cordier marketed himself as a leading market expert. He co-
     > authored a book titled “The Complete Guide to Option Selling.”
     > In May, he penned a bylined article in Futures magazine about
     > the perils of trading in the gas market.

He cautioned about the perils of trading natural gas before getting blown up by it himself?! My eyebrows are raised…

     > In a 2013 lawsuit filed by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
     > Commission (CFTC), James Cordier, president of OptionSellers.com,
     > his partner Michael Gross, and former firm Liberty Trading Group
     > were charged nearly $50,000 for improper trading.

Any fines or citation from the CFTC are never good to see and certainly do not engender trust.

     > Separately, FCStone was involved in its own natural-gas options
     > controversy in 2013. As reported in a CFTC notice in May [2013],
     > the CFTC fined the company $1.5 million for a failure “to prevent
     > an unchecked customer from taking grossly excessive risks” and
     > the brokerage ended up with losses of $127 million.*

FCStone was the brokerage used for Cordier’s trades. Again, this is not good to see.

As these details incrementally cast doubt on Cordier’s enterprise, we must not ignore the fact that the legal firm itself has underlying motives: new business through representation of damaged investors.

The press release continues:

     > Investors in this situation should seek legal counsel now to
     > protect their rights and avoid being wiped out twice. Ironically,
     > you have a hedge fund here that didn’t hedge. Worse yet, the

As mentioned in Part 2, this was not a hedge fund but rather separately managed accounts (SMA). I believe hedge fund risk is limited to no more than the total investment. If that is true, then I am surprised to see an attorney make this obvious mistake.

     > brokerage firm that cleared and executed these trades is now
     > seeking to collect an additional $35 million in margin calls
     > from the same investors that just got wiped out … and also
     > putting the squeeze on them to relinquish their legal rights.
     > This has turned into a real double-whammy nightmare for
     > investors in OptionSellers.com natural gas scheme.

Yes on the double whammy, but if all this was agreed and consented to beforehand as SMA (see fourth paragraph of Part 2), then I really don’t see what liability James Cordier has.

I do see some exaggeration on the part of the legal firm here. The waters are muddy, and as with so many stories and lawsuits, it’s hard to know which side (if) is to blame.

* I wonder how much FCStone will be fined this time since Cordier was clearly taking “grossly excessive risks”
   in losing $150M for his clients.

Testing the Noise (Part 4)

I am now ready (see here and here) to present detailed results of the Noise Test validation analysis.

The strategy counts by market are as follows:

Study results 1 (6-10-20)

DV #1 (original equity curve positioning within the simulated distribution) breaks down as follows:

Study results 2 (6-10-20)

Frequencies are virtually identical for CL regardless of group (winning or losing strategies). Differences are seen for GC and ES with green and red indicating a difference as predicted or contrary to prediction, respectively. The more simulated curves that print above the original backtest, the more encouraged I should be that the strategy is not overfit to noise (see third graph here for illustration of the opposite extreme).

The difference in winning and losing strategies for ES is statistically significant per this website:

Study results 5 (6-10-20)

The difference between winning and losing strategies across all markets is not statistically significant:

Study results 6 (6-10-20)

DV #2 (percentages of strategies with all equity curves finishing breakeven or better) breaks down as follows:

Study results 3 (6-10-20)

The difference seen between winning versus losing GC strategies is marginally significant (questionable relevance and even less so, in my opinion, due to smaller sample size):

Study results 8 (6-10-20)

The difference seen between winning versus losing ES strategies is not statistically significant:

Study results 7 (6-10-20)

DV #3 (average Net Profit range as a percentage of original equity) breaks down as follows:

Study results 4 (6-10-20)

We should expect the simulated equity curves to be less susceptible to noise and therefore lower in range for the winning versus losing strategies. Across all markets, this difference is not statistically significant [(one-tailed) p ~ 0.15]. The difference for GC is statistically significant [t(49) = 2.92, (one-tailed) p ~ 0.003]: in the opposite direction from that expected.

Based on all these results, I do not believe the Noise Test is validated. The reason to stress potential strategies is because of a positive correlation with future profitability. I built 167 random strategies that backtested best of the best and worst of the worst. Unfortunately, I found little difference across my three validation metrics between extreme winners and extreme losers. My ideal hope would have been 12 significant differences in the expected directions. I may have settled for a few less. I got two with only one in the predicted direction.

Perhaps I could at least use Noise Test DV #1 on ES. I might feel comfortable with that if it were not for DV #3 on GC—equally significant, opposite direction—and an overall tally that suggests little more than randomness.

One limitation with this analysis is a potential confounding variable in the number of occurrences of open, high, low, and close (OHLC) in the [two] trading rules. My gut tells me that I should expect number of OHLC occurrences to be proportional to DV #3. A strategy without OHLC in the trading rules should present as a single line (DV #3 = 0%) on the Noise Test because nothing would change as OHLCs are varied. I am uncertain as to how X different OHLCs across the two rules should compare to just one OHLC appearing X times in terms of Noise Test dispersion.

I cannot eliminate this potential confound. However, this would not affect DV #1 and would perhaps only affect DV #2 to a small extent. More importantly, the strategies were built from random signals, which gives me little reason to suspect any significant difference between groups with regard to OHLC occurrences.

Testing the Noise (Part 3)

Today I want to go through the Noise Test validation study, which I described in Part 2.

As I was reviewing screenshots for data evaluation, a few things came to light.

The consistency criterion (second-to-last paragraph of Part 2) is not an issue. All 167 strategies were “consistent” according to the Noise Test. When I decided to monitor this, I now wonder if I was remembering back to the Monte Carlo test instead.

Instead of consistency, I realized on some occasions all of the simulated curves were above zero. This percentage became dependent variable (DV) #2 and implies profitability regardless of noise. DV #1 describes where [Top, Mid(dle), or Bot(tom)] the original backtest terminal value falls within the equity curve distribution. DV #3 is net income range as a percentage of terminal net income for the original backtest.

I never saw the original backtest fall in the bottom third of the equity curve distributions (Bot, DV #1). This would be a most encouraging result that the software developers never presented as an example (see Part 1). Thanks for not deceiving us!

I found myself making some repetitive comments as I scored the data. On 19 occasions, I noted the original equity curve to be at the border of the upper and middle third of the distribution. Since equity values were estimated (platform does not have crosshairs or a data window), I simply alternated scoring Top and Mid whenever this occurred. I did not wish to feign more accuracy than the methods provide.

Also taking place on 19 occasions was a single simulated equity curve (out of 101) finishing below zero. One makes a big difference since the criterion is binary: all curves either avoid negative territory or they do not. This occurred 10 times for CL (split evenly between winning/losing groups), four times for GC (split evenly between winning/losing groups), and five times for ES (four winning and one losing strategy).

I recorded one CL strategy with an extremely profitable outlier and one GC and ES strategy, each, with an extremely unprofitable outlier.

I will present and discuss detailed results next time.

Testing the Noise (Part 2)

Many unprofitable trading ideas sound great in theory. I want to feel confident the Noise Test isn’t one of them.

One big problem I see with the system development platform discussed last time is a lack of norms. In psychology:

     > A test norm is a set of scalar data describing the performance
     > of a large number of people on that test. Test norms can be
     > represented by means and standard deviations.

The lack of a large sample size was part of my challenge discussed in Part 1. The software developers were kind enough to offer a few basic examples. The samples are singular and context is incomplete around each. I need to validate the Noise Test in order to know whether it should be part of my system development process. Without doing this, I run the risk of falling for something that sounds good in theory but completely fails to deliver.

I will begin by using the software to build trading strategies. I will study long/short equities, energies, and metals. I will look for the top and bottom 5-10 in out-of-sample (OOS) performance for each with OOS data selected as beginning and end (doubling sample size and re-randomizing trade signals to get different rules). I will then look at the Noise Test results over the IS period. If the Noise Test has merit, then results should be significantly better for the winners than for the losers.

I will score the Noise Test based on three criteria. First, I can approximate profitability range as a percentage of original net profit. This is understated because the Net Profit scale differs by graph based on maximum value (i.e. always pay attention to the max/min and y-axis tick values!). Second, I can determine whether the original equity curve falls in the middle, near the top, or near the bottom of the total [simulation] sample. For simplicity, I will just eye the range and divide it into thirds.

The final criterion will be consistency. In stress testing different strategies, I noticed these Top/Mid/Bot categories sometimes change from the left to the right edge of the performance graph. Is an example where the original backtest lags for much of the time interval and rallies into the finish really justified in being scored as “Top?” Had the strategy been assessed a few trades earlier, it would have scored as Mid thereby looking better in Noise Test terms (i.e. simulated outperformance relative to actual). Maybe I include only those strategies that score Yes for consistency.

I will continue next time.