Option FanaticOptions, stock, futures, and system trading, backtesting, money management, and much more!

The Disgrace of Karen “Supertrader” Bruton (Part 1)

Over the years, I’ve seen some of my greatest personal heroes fall prey to greed. Barry Bonds and Lance Armstrong are two who were eventually found to be using performance enhancing drugs to cheat sport and gain edge on all competitors. In the process, they also lied to the public with skill that would make a psychopath proud. Much of this is common in the world of fraud, chicanery, and the CNBC television show American Greed—all of which have made frequent appearances in this blog.

In September 2018, Hope Advisors Inc.—the financing arm of a Tennessee nonprofit that promoted economic development in third-world countries—settled fraud charges with the with the Securities and Exchange Commission for $1.5M. You may be more familiar with the name of Hope Advisors owner Karen Bruton. I blogged about this in 2016 with a three-part mini-series starting here.

The current blog mini-series was drafted in August 2016 but never completed. In Part 2 of the current mini-series, I will present a transcript of clips from the video referenced in Part 3. The video has since been taken down—presumably after Bruton’s fraud was discovered. The video featured several people speaking to a “Distinguished Alumni” award given to Bruton from Wake Forest University in 2014.

Option Fanatic, RIA (Appendix C)

Today I will finish tying up the loose ends from this blog mini-series.

I left off discussing compliance for investment advisers (IA).

What limited information I have been able to obtain about standard guidelines implemented by compliance firms has left me somewhat dazed and confused. The red tape certainly does hinder/prevent action. I don’t think it’s all for naught though. With all the chicanery that has run rampant throughout the financial industry (see fourth paragraph here), prospective investors need to be protected.

Should I go forward with my own IA, I will probably hire a lawyer and/or compliance firm that specializes in these matters. I want to trade and study trading-related matters rather than getting stuck in all the red tape.

Should I go forward with my own IA, I may consider pursuit of a relevant credential. My doctorate is in pharmacy, which is not relevant. I don’t have a CFP, a CFA, or even an MBA. I don’t believe the credentials mean much with regard to character (honesty). Nevertheless, they are a symbol of expertise and they may be good for marketing. I would have to get licensed through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), however, by passing the Series 7 and/or Series 65 exams.

Why would people want me to manage their money?

Don’t pick me because I’m good; I don’t believe picking the right stocks or making the right trades is even a thing. All I can do is put the odds in my favor, which is what what I do. From that point onward, if we lose then we lose and the possibility always exists that we will. This is a different mindset but it’s what I believe is really going on.

A better reason to pick me might have to do with my pharmacy experience. What about this:

     > As a pharmacist, you trusted me with your life;
     > you can certainly trust me with your money.

I truly believe this even though it may sound somewhat cheezy. I gave recommendations on medication, taught people how to use medication, and evaluated medication from time to time. If people could trust me with tasks like these—and they most certainly could—then they should also be willing to trust me with their investments.

Option Fanatic, RIA (Appendix B)

Today I will pick up with excerpt [1] from my last post.

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is a thing. Most people probably don’t know it, which would warrant a dedicated post.

The ’40 Act defines an investment adviser (IA) as any person or firm who is engaged in the business of providing advice to others or issuing reports or analyses regarding securities for compensation. The definition includes three parts with each as detailed as you might imagine any legal statute to be.

I disagree with the claim in [1] that “there is no need to be regulated.” If you are acting as an IA then you better be properly registered. Period. If you try to go “off the record” and get paid “under the table” then you’re engaged in tax evasion as well.

The same contributor wrote the following:

       > One of the most important things to consider when you start
       > managing other people’s money is how to deal with potential
       > losses. Most guys who’ve been profitable jump into this business
       > but when the first big loss arrives they have problems coping.
       > What are you going to tell investors? How would they react to
       > losses? Would they flee? How would this affect you financially?
       > Everyone has different psychology. In my career as money
       > manager, I’ve tried to select clients who are psychologically
       > stable and predictable. I had once a client who liked to call
       > he saw an article… about markets going down. He asked… am
       > I sure every time nothing will happen to his money? In three
       > months I decided to return his money and part ways for good.

Probably as much as anything else, this has been a good deterrent over the years against my entry to the IA business. For my own IA, I would be very cautious accepting money from strangers—especially people with little understanding about how the markets work. If working for someone else, though, I may not have much choice what clients I take.

I mentioned “red tape” in the fifth paragraph of Appendix A. Wikipedia describes red tape as follows:

> …an idiom that refers to excessive regulation… that is
> considered redundant or… hinders or prevents action or
> decision-making…
> …generally includes filling out paperwork, obtaining
> licenses, having multiple people or committees approve a
> decision… can also include “filing and certification
> requirements, reporting, investigation… and procedures.

I have studied most of the individual laws, but organizing everything into a manageable whole would be a herculean task. Compliance firms make it their business to handle these challenges for IAs. Compliance firms distill the various components of related laws (e.g. ’40 Act mentioned above, Uniform Securities Act, etc.) into generalized guidelines that will fit as many of their [prospective] clients as possible to maximize compliance firm efficiency.

I will continue tying up loose ends next time.

Option Fanatic, RIA (Appendix A)

In my quest to complete unfinished drafts, what follows are thoughts composed in July 2014 pursuant to this blog mini-series.

In these three posts, I talked about taking custody of client assets with regard to trade opacity and liability. Custody is where a brokerage or other financial institution holds securities on behalf of the client.

Another consideration with regard to custody is trading efficiency. Custody would easily allow me to place all trades at once.

I really have no need to take time shortcuts in executing trades because I would only be looking to trade as many separately managed accounts (SMA) as I could reasonably handle on any given day.

Perhaps more important than opacity or efficiency are the rolls of red tape I would need in order to maintain compliance with the “Custody Rule.” The Custody Rule, part of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, clarifies and builds upon the above [and Part 6] mention of “liability.” Its purpose is to provide protection for client funds or securities against the possibility of loss. I should do a complete blog post on the this since most people probably don’t know it exists.

For multiple reasons, my preference would be to avoid custody altogether. By maintaining control of their own accounts, clients will be able to see how much money they have and how the account is performing in real-time. I am not running a Ponzi scheme or Madoff fraud whereby I take client funds and provide only my trusted word about investment performance. Clients will still get monthly statements from their brokerage rather than only me [or my company].

Trading in SMA is probably in the best interests of the client and myself as adviser when starting out an RIA.

The next issue is whether to incorporate an investment advisory or to stay “off the record.” One internet source volunteered:

       > There is quite a lot of incorrect advice on this thread… if you are
       > carrying out investment business then that is a regulated activity
       > and if you are not regulated then if it all goes wrong then you are…
       > personally liable for all the losses. However it is not as clear cut as
       > all that… although it is a grey area if you are only managing a few
       > peoples money, (it comes under the broad umbrella of friends and
       > family) and it isn’t some [elderly woman] whose life savings you are
       > about to spunk up a wall, then there is no need to be regulated… I
       > would also say this isn’t just my opinion, I have spent a fair few
       > pennies getting legal advice on this very matter in the past. [1]

I will address this next time.

General Theories on System Development (Part 2)

Today I present the conclusion to a two-part series written on December 5, 2012, where I discuss another issue for debate regarding the philosophy of trading system development.

In my last post, I discussed one of two general approaches to system development where I test multiple trading rules on just one ticker.  The second approach flips the first on its head:  backtest one trading rule on multiple tickers in search of the ticker(s) that generates widespread and consistent profit.

The statistical caveat I had regarding the first approach also applies here.  If I test enough tickers on any given trading rule, then some tickers will show significant profits just by chance alone (e.g. one in 100 at the 0.01 level of significance).  In case of the latter, profitable backtesting results are unlikely to be realized in live trading.

Caveat aside, I find this second approach persuasive because of this:

     > Why should long-only trades outperform for S&P 500 and Nasdaq stocks but not
     > small caps?  I’m sure imaginative types could come up with potential explanations
     > but it makes me skeptical about the pattern since they’re all broad-based indices.

This implies a common human psychology underlying all trading behavior. If this is true, then consistency across broad-based stock indices should follow. At best, this consequence seems less likely than to say different stocks have their own personalities for finite periods of time (see fourth paragraph). At worst, the consequence seems downright preposterous.

Today in 2020, I still see logical reason to support both approaches.

For the sake of trading system development, the second approach is a higher hurdle to clear because it requires a strategy to perform well on multiple markets. I think the second approach also begs the question how often and for how long do viable strategies work well for multiple markets and then stop working for some? This seems to be getting meta-meta-complicated compared to “for how long do viable strategies proceed to work?”

The gestalt of everything I have seen, read, and traded over the last 12 years leads me to favor the first approach. I would feel very comfortable with a strategy that works on one ticker but not others inside or outside the same asset class were it able to pass either the walk-forward (Part 1 through Part 4) or data-mining approach to system development.

If I had to grab for some supporting evidence in a pinch, then it would probably be correlation. Commodity trading advisors commonly seek to trade a diversified basket of futures markets to compile a low-to-slightly-negative overall correlation. To think a single strategy should work on these relatively uncorrelated components seems almost like a contradiction in terms.

These are two interesting approaches/theories, tough to sort through, and very much subject to personal preference.

General Theories on System Development (Part 1)

I have a lot of loose ends in this blog. Some of them you see (most recently here). Some of them, which take the form of unpublished drafts, you don’t. What follows (italicized) are unpublished drafts from December 2012. I thought these might be especially interesting to revisit in the midst of my recent algorithmic trading experience.

In this post, long-only outperformance seen with SPY and QQQ did not hold with IWM.  Because I approach system development with a healthy dose of critical analysis [this hasn’t changed!], I tend to question whether the pattern is real when I see something that selectively applies.  This suggests two different approaches to system development.

Let me point out one nuance about terminology. More recently, I have been using “approach” to describe the how of trading system development: walk forward (Part 1 through Part 4) or data mining. With the 2012 posts, “approach” pertains to the what of trading system development: one or multiple markets being tested (using either walk forward or data mining, presumably). Hopefully that allays any potential confusion.

The first approach is to backtest many trading rules [or strategies as I call them in 2020] on one ticker in search of the trading rule(s) that generates widespread and consistent profits when being used to trade that ticker.  This approach implies that different tickers have different personalities.  This may be a reflection of what technical analysis is being used by the largest institutions involved.  For example, suppose institutions accounting for 60% of a ticker’s volume use MACD signals.  I could then expect MACD strategies to work well with said ticker.

This system development approach explains why systems break. Systems are known for working—until they don’t. If different institutions or fund managers start trading a particular issue, then strategies that previously worked may cease to do so…

…if I test enough rules on any given ticker then some rules will show significant profits just by chance alone (e.g. one in 100 at the 0.01 level of significance).  How do I know if I have stumbled upon a true gem or a chance finding?  In case of the latter, profitable results seen in backtesting are unlikely to persist into the future.

This final point is a caution not to buy into the theory too heavily. I can never prove institutions are responsible for a strategy that works. I should never be so confident in that belief that I stop monitoring for signs of a broken system.

Next time, I will discuss an alternative theory about trading systems.

Trading System Development 101 (Part 8)

Last time, I introduced a data-mining approach to trading system development.

To summarize, here are the three steps to developing strategies the data-mining way:

  1. Select: market(s) and test dates, entry signals, exit criteria, and fitness function
  2. Run simulation to create strategies
  3. View resultant strategies, stress test, forward simulate, create portfolios, check correlations, print tradeable code


Although this approach to strategy development does not require me to provide strategies, I am already anticipating an organizational nightmare. The simulations take time (proportional to complexity) and I don’t want any duplicates.

I need to come up with a system to label and track simulations. Each simulation will have entry/exit signals, profit targets, stop-loss, additional exit criteria, designated markets, direction, fitness function, number of trading rules, etc. Many of these selections are mutually exclusive (ME) and will require separate simulations. For example, different fitness functions are going to result in different strategies. I hope number of rules is ME. If not and selecting X rules means < X rather than X and only X, then I will have to give this one more thought. Long versus short is ME and will require a separate simulation.

The software also has other features that will give rise to additional simulations in need of organization. Minimum number of OS trades and/or percentage of total data allocated to OS can vary and give rise to different strategies. The software allows for intermarket signals, which at this point I have no idea how to categorize or test. I can say the same for ensemble strategies, which take positions only when designated combinations of other strategies have done the same.

Although the software creates strategies automatically, the rest has to be done manually. I can’t enter fitness criteria, which means I will have to sort on that based on pre-determined critical values. I will then have to run and eye the stress tests independently. Each stress test will probably give rise to an accept/reject decision. Any reject decision may be reason to move on to the next one. I’ll know more as I get into actual work with the software. In either case, I may want to document what stress tests were done and how they fared: more aspects of this grand organizational feat.

Trading System Development 101 (Part 7)

Today I’m going to start discussing a data-mining approach to trading system development.

With the walk-forward approach, I have to find strategies and program them. Strategies are available in many places: books on technical analysis and trading strategies, articles, blog posts, vendors, webinars, etc.

Coming up with the strategies can take some work, though. In my experience to date, I started with a general familiarity of basic indicators and some e-books. I tested many of those on 2-3 markets. I now need to do some digging in order to continue along this path.

Another approach to trading system development involves data mining. According to microstrategy.com:

     > Data mining is the exploration and analysis of large data to
     > discover meaningful patterns and rules. It’s considered a
     > discipline under the data science field of study… [that]
     > describes historical data… data mining techniques are used
     > to build machine learning models that power modern AI apps
     > such as search engine algorithms…

I started by purchasing point-and-click software that creates trading strategies without any required programming by me.

The software is a genetic algorithm that will search many possible entry signal combinations, exit signals, and other exit criteria to form the best strategies based on selected test criteria and fitness functions (e.g. Sharpe Ratio, net profit, profit factor, etc.).

The software will then create tens to hundreds of strategies that meet my criteria. I can view fitness functions, equity curves, different kinds of Monte Carlo analyses, etc.

The software compares trading signals/strategies against random signals/strategies. This allows me to assess the probability a strategy has edge with predictive value that could not have occurred randomly. While a genetic algorithm curve fits, I don’t want an overfit strategy. A randomly-mined baseline (along with buy-and-hold) can serve as a minimum threshold to beat.

Aside from comparing against random, the software comes pre-packaged with a number of other stress tests that also help to assess whether strategies are honing in on bona fide signal or overfitting to noise. The array of stress tests is impressive. The question is how well they do to forecast profitable strategies. I won’t know that until I find some.

Depending on what particular application is purchased, these packages can do even more. The one I have can build strategy portfolios, track correlations among strategies, and generate full strategy code for different brokerage platforms.

I will continue next time.

What’s the Problem with Walk-Forward Optimization?

I discussed Walk-Forward Optimization (WFO) with regard to trading system development in the fifth paragraph here. My testing thus far has left me somewhat skeptical about the whole WF concept.

I wrote a mini-series about WFO many years ago and explained how it fits into the whole system development paradigm (see here). WFO has many supporters and has been called “the gold standard of trading system validation.”

I have found WFO to be a very high hurdle to clear. I was especially frustrated because multiple times, an expanded feasibility test (i.e. second example here as opposed to seventh paragraph here) passed whereas WFO generated poor results. WFO is basically taking trades at different times from different standard optimizations, which as a whole did pretty well (thereby passing expanded feasibility). How could the entire sequence end up losing money, then?

The easy explanation is different pass criteria for feasibility and WFO. In the feasibility phase, I merely require profitability. The TradeStation criteria for passing WFO phase are:


Although the particular numbers may be changed, this should give a good idea of what a viable strategy might look like: consistently profitable, no huge drawdowns, and relatively short periods of time in between new equity highs.

These criteria are much more stringent than feasibility’s “X% iterations profitable.” This explanation should have satisfied me.

Due to my mounting frustration, however, I couldn’t help but start to rationalize why WFO might be unnecessary for a viable trading system. Here are my thoughts from a few months ago:

     > …aside from generating OS data, which I agree is essential, I think WF
     > screens for an additional characteristic that may not be necessary for
     > real-time profitability. People talk about how managers and asset classes
     > that are the best (worst) during one period end up worse (better) in
     > subsequent periods. WF would reject such mean-reverting strategies due
     > to poor OS performance. Each manager or asset class may be okay to trade,
     > though, as one component of a diversified, noncorrelated portfolio despite
     > the phenomenon of mean reversion… this trainability, for which WFO
     > screens, being altogether unnecessary.

I think it’s an interesting argument: one that can only be settled by sufficient testing.

What’s the alternative without WFO? Probably an expanded feasibility test followed by Monte Carlo simulation.

At this point, I have no practical reason to reject the notion of WFO especially keeping in mind that I may have been conducting the WFO altogether wrong with the coarse grid (see last paragraph here).

Trading System Development 101 (Part 6)

Today I want to tie up some remaining loose ends.

Performance report details need to be carefully considered because subtle interactions may not give us what we want.

I’d kill (figuratively speaking) for a profit factor (PF) of 2.0, for example, but before confirmation bias sweeps me away I need to look closer. Both of these will get me PF = 2.0: $100K profit + $50K loss and $200K profit + $100K loss. Assuming this is trading one contract with a $100K account, I now know the former, unlike the latter, will not be interesting to me. The latter has a good chance to meet my criteria and be viable.

As another example, I need to look closer before getting overly excited about a strategy that generates an average trade of +$1,000. This is much more attractive for an average trade duration of five days than it is 50-100. The latter will have far fewer trades and less overall profitability. This is worthy of note even though most backtesting platforms I have seen do not display average trade per day (as mentioned in third-to-last paragraph here).

Finally, the interaction between trade duration and sample size was discussed in the third-to-last paragraph here. In Part 4, I mentioned some people would be happy with a longer duration strategy. Of important statistical note is the fact that trade duration and sample size are inversely related.

One advantage to longer duration is lower transaction fees (slippage and commission). Transaction fees (TF) are an enormous enemy of net profits. For every trade, TF is constant while longer trades allow for more market movement and potentially larger profits. The adverse impact of TF is therefore inversely related to trade duration. I have to laugh when I think about all the intraday systems I have seen discussed online. I already know the difficulty of finding viable strategies on the daily time frame; viable intraday strategies are probably much harder to find! Combining this rationale with the frequent footnote that so many studies don’t include TF helps this all to make sense.

Until your testing proves otherwise, let this be the one takeaway with regard to TF: many strategies that fail on a short time frame have a much better chance to work if trades are held much longer because average trade may then be large enough to more than offset multiple commissions.

Is anyone still enamored with day trading? I hope not.

Next time, I will begin discussion of a different approach to system development.