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Trading Epic Fury (Part 6)

Today I will discuss why the last two trading days (Thursday and Friday) are exactly what I did not want to see, pros and cons, and future directions.

In the second paragraph of Part 4, I mentioned the rangebound market in spite of Epic Fury. Then we get two straight 100+ down days for the S&P 500:

The market is trending lower as an orderly decline until the last trading day that breaches the lower [Bollinger] band of the channel. The feeling from this day is more like falling out of bed and hitting the floor because the second-to-last incident report [bullet point] indicator (also mentioned in the final Part 4 paragraph) just triggered.

Volatility (VIX) looks as follows:

Although shocking to see VIX up 3+ points on the day (after being up 2.5 points on Thursday: both circled), it doesn’t really meet the Part 3 criteria of a strong close because it’s not far greater than anything over the past weeks/months. It’s higher than the previous high on Mar 6 (arrow) but not by a lot.

Despite feeling like I have a black eye from losing 3.1% in one day, I have some things to feel good about:

  1. Lost 1.1% for the week whereas SPX lost 2.1%.
  2. Still very close to equity ATH whereas SPX is roughly 9% lower.
  3. RSI is now overbought for VIX and oversold for SPX, which suggests near-term relief rally (not guaranteed!).
  4. Decreased downside exposure Friday by closing one put contract.
  5. Revisiting penultimate paragraph of Part 4, TD is still over 30.

I have plenty to be concerned about, however. Despite (5), the black eye has much to do with high positive delta. SPX falling 100 points can be tolerated when starting near delta neutral (4-digit TD on Wednesday). Otherwise, look out below and Friday began with the highest Epic Fury position delta thus far. Despite rolling calls down and even selling a couple more, I left myself with delta basically unchanged from Thursday, with TD halved, and with higher gamma: sounds like something of a fail.

Another concern is that (4) may not be as good as advertised. I started thinking a week ago that I could enter into a put-rolling campaign if necessary because the decline is likely to be time-limited. Along with (3), this represents blatant triggering of the above-linked incicent report’s final indicator. Recall John Maynard Keynes’ quote from Part 5 paragraph 3. Furthermore, while PMR is currently < 50% NLV, that can skyrocket in a heartbeat if the market continues [accelerates] lower.

Things to start tracking on a daily basis include:

I will continue next time.

Trading Epic Fury (Part 5)

Upon Part 4 completion discussing things that haven’t happened, they suddenly do. Let’s talk about the damage.

Equities continued their selloff on Friday with SPX down over 100 points and VIX spiking to 28. In Part 4, I discuss this second-to-last indicator (bullet point). Friday then delivers my biggest daily loss in about six weeks along with full VIX term structure backwardation (just after mentioning it wasn’t). Despite these triggers and underperforming the benchmark, I outperformed for the week (roughly +1.5% versus -1.0%) and am within my recent NLV range. For these reasons I maintained status quo.

I may now be in violation of the incident report guidelines. Part of the challenge is that I seem so much better positioned now than in the past when I’ve been fresh off catastrophic loss. As I’ve mentioned: PMR is relatively low, total contract size is low, TD is healthy, and delta neutral is not far away. John Maynard Keynes is attributed to having said “the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.” I need to keep this in mind because even though short-term mean reversion usually occurs, nobody knows when.

In support of “do something now!” is my large daily loss just posted. If it happens once then it can happen again.

Hurting on Friday was my Part 2 implicit guideline to trade only near the close. On a market trend day, I will get hurt waiting until the close and Friday was one such day where most of the day I lost due to positive delta. Do not be deceived: despite my EOD greeks looking fine, until those trade adjustments they looked worse and contributed to losses. Avoiding intraday trading can prevent whipsaws on choppy days, however.

While either approach has its pros and cons, unverified data per Google AI is consistent with what I’ve anecdotally heard discussed for years. Choppy days have accounted for at least 60% in 11 of 26 years available since 2000. On the whole, delaying trade until EOD seems like a better setup for success.

I don’t feel overly concerned given my current greeks and position size, but reasons to ditch the rose-colored glasses include:

Trading Epic Fury (Part 4)

I concluded Part 3 by saying Feb 5 does not trigger the second indicator (bullet point) here after stating in Part 2 that Mar 6 is also negative. The way Epic Fury has gone for me thus far, though, even a positive trigger leaves me with little to do.

Over the preceding weeks, VIX has been around 22-24 rather than the 14-17 seen during quiescent market periods over the last few years. Given constant position size, higher volatility means more extrinsic value and more negative vega. To be hurt by volatility spikes, VIX needs to spike higher and trade much higher than it did a few months ago. This can certainly happen—we’ve seen VIX as high as mid-80s over the last 10 years! It won’t happen with the market rangebound, though. We’ll see what happens next.

Over 90% of my portfolio has now turned over with an average VIX of 22-24. Volatility contraction to the previous 14-17 will benefit me. Volatility acceleration will hurt, but even a 10-point spike would probably cost less than 5% of my NLV. Other things [i.e. delta, gamma] could hurt more than volatility.

Since trading shorter-dated options and collecting less premium, I have been watching closely and letting contracts expire worthless. I shouldn’t really be doing this but in my defense, last Thursday I closed three different tranches of monthly (AM expiry) options despite being far OTM. In wartime, I wouldn’t be surprised by any big move and did not want to risk some of those contracts settling ITM. Kudos to me for keeping a cleaner kitchen.

In general for the Weeklys, nothing to date has been close at expiration partly because I have been gradually allowing total put contract size to decrease. My PMR is less than 50% NLV and that provides me with substantial flexibility. I’ve tried not to add more downside contracts but now three weeks in, I will as needed to keep theta high alongside TD.

Keeping TD high brings me back to the last paragraph of Part 1: selling more [short-dated] calls. As a result, I usually maintain 50-70 SPX points away from delta-neutral after daily trades. On market down days, I have at times sold more calls but with the gradual decrease, I will start to replace with fresh puts to offset the calls. If backwardation worsens then I will consider further decreasing risk by not replacing expired puts and selling fewer calls as well.

Another thing to watch for is the second-to-last bullet point here. That just hasn’t happened so far due to the other tweaks discussed. Along with my current PMR and knowledge that the lion’s share of my portfolio is now “snow tire equipped” (positions open at VIX 22-24 rather than 14-17) provides me with a great amount of mental fortitude and confidence in trading from one day to the next.

Trading Epic Fury (Part 3)

Before moving on, I want to go back to the bottom screenshot in Part 2 and discuss the first arrow (Feb 5) with regard to the second bullet point here. Is that a time to do something?

I need to explain what I mean by “strong close.” I don’t have a quantitative (objective) definition and probably wouldn’t try to come up with one without rigorous backtesting [a whole other discussion]. I’m also not looking for “perfect,” which doesn’t exist. If the market starts acting wonky and this strong close indicator doesn’t trigger, then another of the six probably will.

Having said all that, my qualitative concept of the “strong close” indicator is something like:

To assess whether Feb 5 is a positive trigger, I need to zoom out on VIX daily. The following chart goes back to Oct 2025:

All four annotated candles are closing highs over the recent past. The first arrow is wide-ranging and the strongest because it closes at session high [impactfulness is directly proportional to lookback period and although I’d have to scroll chart left to determine the period, here I just want to illustrate “wide-ranging”]. The second arrow is a higher close that has an upside wick and does not exceed the open of the large down candle following the first arrow: not a great exemplar for strength. The third arrow is a doji: not impressive despite being a 6-week high. A case could be made one candle earlier because while the tombstone is not wide-ranging, this is substantially higher than the previous month due to gapping up.

The fourth arrow—Feb 5—does not seem to be a “strong close.” It’s the highest close in over two months but only marginally higher than the third arrow. It is [probably] wide-ranging but has an upside wick. The qualitative criteria are really intended to specify a case that is clear-cut, blatant, indisputable, and decisive. Year-to-date volatility has trended up with higher highs but I haven’t seen a sudden, huge volatility explosion that might signify the storm is now upon us and buckle down the hatches!

I will continue next time.

Trading Epic Fury (Part 2)

Today I continue from the third paragraph of Part 1 to review the charts on what Epic Fury has done to the markets.

I spoke with a friend yesterday whose portfolio is down substantially year-to-date. She spoke about how the markets have been so unpredictable since the war began. “Today is the first time in a month that we have had back-to-back up days,” she said. “The market will often be down 1,000 points, etc… my calls are way under water.”

Looking at a daily chart of SPX (S&P 500 cash index) since last trading day of Jan (30th), most of what she said is not true:

The index is down from roughly 6920 to 6720 in that time or (6720 – 6920) / 6920 * 100% = 2.9%. Bear market is a 20% decline while a “market correction” is often said to be a 10% decline. So far, 2.9% is very little.

For my friend’s Jan ’27 long calls, any decline is bad. With six weeks amounting to 13% of the remaining time to expiration (Jan 15), pain from time decay will be noticeable. Her feelings about the market may be colored by the unrealized loss.

Here’s a daily chart of volatility (VIX) since Epic Fury begins:

Leftmost bar is Mar 2. VIX increases a small amount from ~21.8 to 22.5 over the period. Mar 6 (arrow) is the biggest advance with a VIX close near 30 (SPX ~6740). The following day, VIX opens near 35 but closes near 25. This [and second arrow in top chart] is a very wide-ranging day [(~6640 to 6800 close on SPX—first arrow in top chart—on a day when ATR(14) actually tops out year-to-date], but trading just near the close (one of my implicit guidelines) has prevented potential whipsaws from the large intraday ranges.

To see if I have violated this second bullet point, I need to zoom out for a longer look at VIX. The following is daily YTD:

A gradual increase before Epic Fury is evident by the rising 20-SMA (blue line) since Jan 19. The first arrow on Feb 5 is the highest VIX close before Epic Fury. None of the first four trading days after the operation begins (circled) are large, strong, multi-week (or month) highs exceeding Feb 5. The first three candles are down days [first big, second huge upside wick suggesting volatility rejection, third like the first with close far below the open], and the fourth closes lower than the previous three opens. Mar 6 (second arrow) would be the day to “do something” except there’s really nothing to do.

Next time, I will explain why that is.

Trading Epic Fury (Part 1)

Year-to-date, 2026 has been quite a surprise for me. While I won’t talk about performance just yet [first need to review the past few years to catch up from here], I can discuss my trading strategy especially with regard to the incident report I finally got around to posting.

With Operation Epic Fury beginning in the early hours of Feb 28 (all dates 2026 unless otherwise specified), the first real signs of backwardation occur on Mar 3. VIX is already somewhat elevated (20.10 compared to 14-17) the Friday before Epic Fury. Monday, Mar 2, sees spot VIX at 21.22 and moving into the term-structure range (higher than the front two months and lower than the rest). On Tuesday, spot VIX hits 22.80 and is higher than all but the last two months with the first three months in true backwardation. Relevant to assess at this time are these second and third bullet points.

I will take a closer look at daily SPX and VIX charts to illustrate further what kind of impact Epic Fury has had on the markets.

The incident report directs me to hedge the position when daily moves in the market become more frequent (first bullet point). I haven’t explicitly done this. While always aware of big moves on the current trading day, I have yet to start tracking daily SD moves longitudinally: something that will be getting onto my spreadsheet very soon.

Despite the shortcoming, I have done a few other things to indirectly accomplish the same thing. First, since VIX started to perk up I’ve been trading options closer to expiration. I don’t have the exact date at hand [perhaps a few months ago?], but at some point I noticed the ability to go the same distance OTM with shorter-dated options for comparable premium. The result has been significantly higher theta and a consistently high theta:delta ratio (TD). I suspect position gamma has also been higher but a largely rangebound market despite the war and soaring oil prices has kept this threat on the sidelines.

Selling more calls has helped to boost TD. In addition to DITM short calls managed on a campaign basis (rolling up and out), I now carry as many as five additional [very] short-dated calls. As mentioned above, this probably causes gamma to soar but with America at war, climbing the “wall of worry” is a minor concern while risk of a runaway market seems de minimis [quite to the contrary, on many days part of me has been expecting to see a market crash].

I will continue next time.

Simple SPX Put Credit Spread Strategy (Part 3)

Today I want to wrap up discussion of the simple (I hope!) put credit spread strategy whose guidelines are provided here.

Continuing the discussion of strategy tweaks, instead of entering on a down day I could just enter every first (or second, third, fourth, or last) trading day of the week. My concern is missing a trade and throwing off the once/week to better define total risk. Historically, down days occur 45-47% of the time so I’m almost guaranteed to have one down day every trading week. And if I don’t then why not just take two the following week? I can’t think of a good reason unless entering on down days does not really provide a volatility advantage (in which case why do it?). It certainly can provide a volatility advantage (farther OTM can mean larger margin of safety unless volatility continues to increase) so I might as well.

A more extreme consideration would be to enter after consecutive down days. This should most certainly provide some volatility advantage at the cost of fewer occurrences. Historically, the chance of a down day is 46% with chance of a consecutive down day a bit less. Conservatively, then, I could estimate 0.44 * 0.34 * 100% * 99 pairs = 14.8 instances every 100 trading days. Also keep in mind that down days tend to cluster during periods of high probability. I could have some intervals of 100 trading days where consecutive down days happen only 7-10 times versus others where they may happen 30 or more times. The risk is having fewer trades on during market environments almost certain to produce winners while maxing out risk during market environments more likely to produce losers.

Since it’s tough to predict these things (especially given past performance is no guarantee of future results), maybe I employ Occam’s razor and enter on trading day #1 (or #2 or #3 or #4 or last) of every week. Another potential benefit to this is spreading out entry points as opposed to having a slew of trades on consecutive days that could lead to more short contracts at the same strikes. The latter is a concern because I’d hate to have lots of contracts at one strike that will all close at stop-loss as opposed to put spreads 25-50 points apart, for example, where only one or two might be stopped out.

Besides “trade every X days and always have Y trades open” to eliminate variability in exposure from “on a down day” or “at swing lows,” etc. (most of which I just discussed above), the strategy may be tweaked in several other ways such as:

I could go on deliberating but for the most part, it’s a simple strategy and rather than overthinking just proceed with one contract/week to see what happens. That’s my plan going forward and once I have some closed trades under my belt, I can analyze how it’s going or look closer at any single trade.

Simple SPX Put Credit Spread Strategy (Part 2)

Today I want to give more details about the simple (hopefully) SPX put credit spread strategy.

Much of what I said in Part 1 can be expanded but I will start with some benefits about trading SPX:

Expectancy is the long-term average profit across many trades: (% wins * mean win) – (% losses * mean loss).
Supposing average spread is sold for $1.00 with $3.00 max loss and 80% winners:

Expectancy = [0.8 * ($100 * 0.5)] – (0.2 * $200) = $0 (breakeven).

Although each spread is sold for $1.00 (100 multiplier to get $100/contract), recall profits are taken at 50% net credit = $50 and losses closed for 3x initial credit result in a net loss of $3.00 – $1.00 (credit initially received) = $2.00 ($200/contract).

Supposing the strategy produces 85% winners:

Expectancy = [0.85 * ($100 * 0.5)] – (0.15 * 200) = $12.50/trade.

Supposing the strategy produces 90% winners:

Expectancy = [0.90 * ($100 * 0.5)] – (0.10 * 200) = $25.00/trade.

With the spread being 25 points, the net risk is $2,500/contract minus initial credit. To calculate Return on Risk (ROR), divide expectancy by net risk. ROR for 85% winners is therefore [ $12.50 / ($2,500 – $100) ] * 100% = 0.52%. If average trade is 3-4 weeks then roughly one trade per month is (0.52% * 12) ~ 6.2% per year.

While I am admittedly underwhelmed by that number, the calculation does use conservative inputs. Win percentage will probably be higher and days in trade will probably be lower.

Capital usage is not understated and difficult to quantify. ROR denominator is the maximum amount of capital ever allocated to the strategy. The number of open trades will constantly vary so returns are going to be somewhat diluted by additional cash on the sidelines as dry powder.

Setting a maximum number of open trades is one way to limit capital usage. For example, no more than one trade allowed per week with no more than four trades open at any given time limits total risk to $2,400 * 4 = $9,600. A total return can now be calculated by dividing net profit by $9,600.

Here are some other ideas to consider:

I will continue next time with more potential strategy tweaks.

ZTS Stock Study (3-11-26)

I recently did a stock study on Zoetis Inc. (ZTS, $120.49).

M* writes:

     > Zoetis sells anti-infectives, vaccines, parasiticides,
     > diagnostics, and other health products for animals. The
     > firm earns roughly 35% of total revenue from production
     > animals (cattle, pigs, poultry, and so on) and nearly 65%
     > from companion animal (dogs, horses, cats) products. Its
     > USA business is skewed even more heavily toward
     > companion animals, while its international business is
     > slightly skewed toward production animals. The firm has
     > the largest market share in the industry and was
     > previously Pfizer’s animal health unit.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company grows sales and EPS at annualized rates of 8.0% and 15.4%, respectively. Lines are up, straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 100. Shares outstanding decrease 10.9% (1.3%/year).

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 25.1% to 35.5% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 33.7%. ROE leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 42.8% in ’17 to 66.3% in ’18 with a last-5-year mean of 45.6%. Debt-to-Capital is greater than peer and industry averages while ranging from 57.5% in ’23 to 75.0% in ’16 with a last-5-year mean of 62.8%.

Quick Ratio is 1.75 and Interest Coverage 16.1 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and a B grade for Financial Health (per BetterInvesting® website). VL rates the company A for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting below the range at 4.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 6.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 8.7%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $6.02/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 29.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E ranges from 29.5 in ’25 to 58.4 in ’21 with a last-5-year mean of 43.7 and last-5-year-mean average P/E of 35.3. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 15.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E ranges from 19.1 in ’25 to 33.1 in ’21 with a last-5-year mean of 26.9. I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $90.30 is default based on initial value from above. This is 25.1% less than previous close and 21.7% less than 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, Payout Ratio (PR) increases from 23.0% to 33.2% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 29.4%. I am forecasting below the range at 17.0%.

These inputs land ZTS in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 3.8. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 15.2%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 9.4% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 156 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 62 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 4.7%, 7.2%, 30.0, 20.0, and 27.4% respectively. I am lower across the board. VL [M*] projects a future average P/E of 25.0 [14.0, which seems unreasonably low] that is equal to MS and greater than mine (22.0).

MS high / low EPS are $8.45 / $5.87 versus my $8.06 / $6.02 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL (M*) high EPS of $8.20 ($8.34) is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $108.50 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 18.5: less than the above-stated 20.0. MS LSPF is 7.6% greater than the default $5.87/share * 20.0 = $117.40 that results in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF exceeds mine by 20.2%, however.

MOS is robust in the study because my inputs are less than historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges. Also backing this assessment is MS TAR exceeding mine by 1.6% per year and my lower LSPF.

Regarding valuation, PEG is 1.9 and 3.1 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: a bit overvalued (M* has 1.7). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is exceedingly low at 0.57. M* has stock trading at a 29% discount.

Some would argue this is not a high-quality growth stock because forecast growth rates are less than 9.0%-10.0%. I don’t adhere to these criteria and have faced some criticism over it. One good thing about the BetterInvesting® methodology is some room for subjectivity. Indeed, we don’t have sufficient data or studies necessary to prove any is one best answer.

Per U/D, ZTS is a BUY under $126/share. BetterInvesting® TAR criterion would be met [233.7 / ((13.87 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5]
~ $122 given a forecast high price ~$234.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

Simple SPX Put Credit Spread Strategy (Part 1)

Today I am going to discuss a relatively simple S&P 500 (SPX) put credit spread strategy.

The goal here is to enhance my routine with more discipline. I already check the market around the same time every trading day and usually execute something [may or may not be a good thing]. I track my balances and margin requirements daily. I track bond purchases and the greeks (related to this post but something seems different lately that has rendered some of these triggers less important—potentially a separate discussion altogether): theta, delta, gamma, and vega.

As discussed in the third paragraph here, after repeated episodes of catastrophic loss I want to do something different. A simple strategy will suffice until I do more research to develop that next step.

The strategy is as follows:

I think the biggest challenge facing the strategy is closing at stop-loss. I would not use a GTC (or OCO) closing order because quirky option quotes happen and I’d hate to get taken out when the market is proceeding with normalcy and no hint of turbulence. One approach I could use is:

  1. Walk the option chain NTM by 25-point strikes to identify first closing spread for at least 2x opening credit.
  2. Subtract difference between identified short strike and positional short strike.
  3. Subtract (2) from current SPX price.
  4. Set an “equal to or below” price alert on SPX for (3).
  5. Upon receiving alert, go into the trading platform and monitor the position with live quotes.
  6. Close spread with limit order should it reach 3x initial credit.

Whether to close with a market or limit order is debatable and some experimentation may be worthwhile. SPX options are generally liquid enough to use market orders with good execution. I still think a limit order leaving ample room for slippage (e.g. $0.10 – $0.25) is preferable especially because of the occasional fluke quote mentioned above. “Experimentation” means limit order close enough times to make for a valid sample size, which could take months or years. Losses don’t typically occur often with this strategy and they generally cluster around periods of heightened market volatility.

I will continue next time.