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DECK Stock Study (10-16-25)

I recently did a stock study on Deckers Outdoor Corp. (DECK, $96.44).

M* writes:

     > Founded in 1973, California-based Deckers designs and sells
     > casual and performance footwear, apparel, and accessories.
     > In fiscal 2025, Ugg and Hoka accounted for 51% and 45% of
     > total sales, respectively. The firm also markets niche brands
     > Teva and Ahnu. Deckers produces most of its sales through
     > wholesale partnerships but also operates e-commerce in more
     > than 50 countries and about 180 company-operated stores. It
     > generated 64% of its fiscal 2025 sales in the United States.

Since 2018, this medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 15.8% and 34.3%, respectively (earlier years excluded due to small EPS mathematically distorting growth rate). Lines are up, straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability rating of 90.

Since 2018 (FY ends 3/31; reference to year at BI website and VL incremented to match), PTPM leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 11.6% to 24.9% in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 20.7%. ROE leads peers but trails the industry while increasing from 10.6% to 36.1% in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 30.6%. The company has no long-term debt and is therefore lower than peers and the industry on Debt-to-Capital with a last-5-year mean of 11.9% (rentals).

Quick Ratio is 2.02 and Interest Coverage is 374 (consistent with no long-term debt) per M* who assigns a “Narrow” Economic Moat, gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and offers a B grade for Financial Health. VL rates the company A for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 7.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 4.0% per year forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of seven: 7.0%). My initial value will be ’25 EPS of $6.33/share rather than 2026 Q1 $6.52 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 20.0. Since 2018, high P/E increases from 27.6 to 35.4 in ’25 for a last 5-year mean of 29.0 and last 5-year-mean average P/E of 21.1. I am forecasting well below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 9.0. Since 2018, low P/E ranges from 8.2 in ’20 to 17.0 in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 13.1. I am forecasting below the range and current P/E (14.8).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is $67.00. Default ($57.00) based on initial value given above seems unreasonably low at 40.9% (39.2%) less than the previous close (52-week low). My arbitrary selection is 30.5% (28.5%) less, respectively, and 5.2% less than the 2023 low price.

These inputs land DECK in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.0. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 9.8%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is less than the current risk-free rate (T-bills) at 3.0%. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on the TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 177 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 53 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 9.0%, 8.6%, 24.6, and 13.0. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average annual P/E of 20.0, which is higher than MS (18.8) and much higher than mine (14.5).

MS high / low EPS are $9.80 / $6.49 versus my $7.70 / $6.33 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower growth rate. Value Line’s high EPS is in the middle at $9.25.

MS LSPF of $83.00 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 12.8: less than the above-stated 13.0. MS LSPF is 1.6% less than the default $6.49/share * 13.0 = $84.37 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 23.9% greater than mine.

I believe MOS is robust in this study because my inputs are below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. MS TAR of 17.5% is 7.7% per year greater than mine.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 4.1 and 3.6 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: significantly overvalued (0.48 per M* suggests undervalued, however). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is cheap at 0.70.

Per U/D, DECK is a BUY under $88/share. BI TAR criterion is met ~ $77 given a forecast high price ~$154 (no dividend).

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

LULU Stock Study (10-16-25)

I recently did a stock study on Lululemon Athletica Inc. (LULU, $167.10). Previous studies are here, here, and here.

M* writes:

     > Lululemon Athletica Inc. designs, distributes, and markets
     > athletic apparel, footwear, and accessories for women, men,
     > and girls. Lululemon offers pants, shorts, tops, and jackets
     > for both leisure and athletic activities such as yoga and
     > running. The company also sells fitness accessories, such
     > as bags, yoga mats, and equipment.

Over the past decade, this large-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 21.6% and 26.5%, respectively [FY ends 1/31; reference to year at BI website and Value Line (VL) incremented to match]. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dips in ’18, ’21, and ’23. VL gives an Earnings Predictability rating of 90.

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 16.4% in ’23 to 24.3% in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 20.6%. ROE is roughly equal to industry averages while trailing peers, increasing from 24.5% in ’16 to 44.7% in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 35.9%. Debt-to-Capital is zero through 2019 and remains lower than peer and industry averages as the company maintains no long-term debt. The last-5-year mean is 25.0% (leases).

Current (Quick) Ratio is 2.27 (1.04) per M* who assigns a “Narrow” Economic Moat, gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and offers a C grade for Financial Health [seems puzzling]. VL rates the company B++ for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 3.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 1.0% per year forecast is near bottom of the range (mean of six: 7.0%). My initial value will be ’25 EPS of $14.64/share rather than 2026 Q2 $14.71 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 24.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E ranges from 32.9 in ’25 to 64.9 in ’22 (’21 upside outlier of 88.9 excluded) for a last 5-year mean of 50.4 and last 5-year-mean average P/E of 39.3. I am well below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 9.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E ranges from 15.4 in ’25 to 37.7 in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 28.2. I am forecasting below the range and current P/E (11.5).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $131.80 is default based on initial value given above. This is 21.1% (17.3%) less than the previous close (52-week low).

These inputs land LULU in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 5.4. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 16.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is less than I seek for a large-size company at 8.5%. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 136 studies done in the past 90 days (31 outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 6.0%, 7.3%, 24.4, and 12.0. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average annual P/E of 15.0, which is lower than MS (18.2) and lower than mine (16.5).

MS high / low EPS are $20.83 / $14.10 versus my $15.39 / $14.64 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower growth rate. Value Line’s high EPS is in the middle at $16.00/share.

MS LSPF of $147.30 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 10.4: less than the above-stated 12.0. MS LSPF is 12.9% less than the default $14.10/share * 12.0 = $169.20 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 11.8% greater than mine.

I believe MOS is robust in this study because my inputs are near or below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. MS TAR of 22.5% is 5.6% per year greater than mine.

Anecdotally speaking, valuation metrics are about as dichotomous as any stock I have ever studied. PEG is 10.6 and 11.4 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: beyond significantly overvalued. VL agrees: “hold off… until tangible signs of a turnaround emerge. While some view the recent pullback as a buying opportunity, we see elevated downside risk amid deteriorating sentiment, increased competition, and a premium category still struggling to regain traction.” On the other hand, Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is dirt cheap at 0.29, Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF” calculates fair value 154% greater than the previous close, and CFRA has fair value 104% greater. CNN Business finds 34 analysts with 12-month stock forecasts ranging between 40% below to 81% above the previous close.

Despite a robust MOS, because of the tremendous uncertainty expressed here I would discount the following target prices an additional amount (e.g. 10%).

Per U/D, LULU is a BUY under $191/share. BI TAR criterion is met ~ $184 given a forecast high price ~$369 (no dividend).

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

Market Measures: An AI Take

I mentioned Market Measures (MM) in the last post. Before going into details about particular episodes, I want to provide an overview of what MM is.

In this day and age, I feel the necessity to get familiar with and lean on AI. To that end, I have asked Perplexity to help us out:

     MM is a segment on tastylive that focuses on advanced trading mechanics and analysis.
     It aims to provide traders with in-depth insights into various aspects of the
     market, regardless of their experience level. The show covers a wide range of
     topics, including:
     
         1. Options probabilities and volatility
     
         2. Trading strategies for options and futures
     
         3. Analysis of market behavior and trends
     
     Recent episodes of MM have explored:
     
         1. Exit times and profit targets for zero-DTE options
     
         2. Optimal profit targets for different delta strangles and 45 DTE trades
     
         3. Intraday market behavior analysis, including volume patterns and index movements
     
     The segment uses data-driven approaches to examine trading mechanics, helping viewers
     build strategies to manage more winning trades. By delving into complex market
     dynamics, MM equips traders with the knowledge to make informed decisions and
     refine their trading techniques.

Google Generative AI gives us:

     MM by Tastytrade, hosted on platforms like Tastytrade, analyzes market volatility,
     reversal probabilities, and trading strategies, offering insights for traders to
     improve their decision-making.
     
     MM delves into various aspects of market analysis, including:
     
          1. Volatility and Reversal Probabilities: Analyzing market swings and predicting
              potential reversals.
     
          2. Trading Strategies: Exploring different approaches to trading, including options,
              futures, and more.
     
          3. Market Dynamics: Understanding the underlying forces and structures that drive
              market behavior.
     
     Key Concepts:
     
     Market Profile Analysis: A method of analyzing market data to identify value areas,
     price rejection points, and the strength of buyers and sellers.
     
     Contrarian Trading: Strategies that capitalize on market reversals after
     significant moves.
     
     Examples:
     
     “How Long Does Market Chaos Last?”: An episode that examines the duration of market
     volatility.
     
     “Since 1994: Market Reversal Data Revealed”: An episode that analyzes historical
     market data to identify patterns of reversal.
     
     Benefits for Traders:
     
     Improved Decision-Making: By understanding market dynamics and potential risks,
     traders can make more informed decisions.
     
     Enhanced Trading Strategies: The show provides insights into various trading
     strategies and techniques.
     
     Risk Management: Learning about volatility and reversal probabilities can help
     traders manage their risk effectively.

Besides never seeing anything on Market Profile Analysis, I think this to be a solid overview.

The segment generally lasts 10-20 minutes and is produced ~4 times per week. Most present a Research Team study that has taken tens of man-hours to complete. Segments are generally hosted by Tom Sosnoff and Tony Battista. Members of the Research Team occasionally make appearances to provide added technical expertise. Tom Preston also makes an occasional appearance. These folks represent a tremendous amount of floor trading, data science, and option modeling experience.

All MM episodes are archived on the tastytrade website along with slides for each segment.

Next time, I will pick up in mid-2019 with a deeper look at particular segments.

ANF Stock Study (9-23-25)

I recently did a stock study on Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (ANF, $87.77).

M* writes:

     > Abercrombie & Fitch Co is a specialty retailer that sells casual
     > clothing, personal-care products, and accessories for men, women,
     > and children. It sells direct to consumers through its stores
     > and websites, which include the Abercrombie & Fitch, Abercrombie
     > kids, and Hollister brands. Majority stores are in the United
     > States, but the company does have many stores in Canada,
     > Europe, and Asia. All stores are leased. Abercrombie ships to
     > well over 100 countries via its websites. The company sources
     > its merchandise from dozens of vendors that are located in Asia
     > and Central America. Abercrombie has two distribution centers
     > in Ohio to support its North American operations. It uses
     > third-party distributors for sales in Europe and Asia.

Over the past 10 years, this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 3.1% and 38.8%, respectively. Lines are generally up and parallel with sales and EPS down in ’17 (references to year from Value Line and BI website incremented by 1 to align with FY ending Jan 31), ’21 (huge drop to negative EPS, which could probably be excluded due to COVID), and ’23. Ten- (Five-) year EPS R^2 is 0.14 (0.35) and Value Line gives an Earnings Predictability score of 10. I think whether this passes visual inspection is debatable.

Over the past decade, PTPM trails peer and industry averages despite increasing from 1.6% (’16) to 15.5% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 7.1%. ROE also trails peer and industry averages despite increasing from 2.7% (’16) to 43.2% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 18.2%. Debt-to-Capital is less than the industry and about even with peers while increasing from 20.5% (’16) to 41.6% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 55.5% (all rentals and leases as company has no long-term debt).

Value Line gives a B+ rating for Financial Strength. Quick Ratio is 0.75 but Interest Coverage is 323 per M* who assigns “Standard” for Capital Allocation (and suggests negatively that balance sheet may be too conservative)

With regard to sales growth:

My 3.0% forecast is at bottom of the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 1.0% per year forecast is just below the range of three long-term estimates (mean 4.7%). Initial value is 2026 Q2 EPS of $10.57/share rather than ’25 EPS of $10.69.

My Forecast High P/E is 14.0. Over the past decade, high P/E falls from 55.3 in ’16 to 18.4 in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 15.7 (excluding NMF and 842 in ’21 and ’23, respectively) and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 10.9. I am near bottom of the range (only 11.7 in ’22 is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 5.0. Over the past decade, low P/E falls from 30.2 in ’16 to 9.5 in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 6.1 (excluding NMF and 285 in ’21 and ’23, respectively). I am forecasting near bottom of the range (only 3.5 in ’24 are lower).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $52.90 is default based on initial value given above. This is 39.7% less than previous closing price and 19.1% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land ANF in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.9. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 12.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 3.8% is just under the risk-free rate (T-Bill). If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I usually compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS) but only six total studies currently show on the website: too small a sample size for comparison.

Value Line’s projected average annual P/E (high EPS) of 10.5 ($12.25) is greater than my 9.5 ($11.11).

These observations along with my inputs near or below respective analyst/historical ranges lead me to believe MOS is robust in the current study.

In doing the study, my gut tells me not to use a Forecast Low P/E of 6.0, which would still be in the lower end of the range. Historical P/E distribution is very spotty, though, with 10 years including one NMF, two triple digits, 3.5, and 5.4. 3.5 seems excessively low for the industry and 5.4 is highly questionable. That leaves only five viable data points with one [maybe two] in the last five years. Not much to go on with high variability necessitates more conservative inputs. 6.0 rather than 5.0 makes for a more reasonable LSPF (closer to 30% less than previous close rather than 40%) and leaves the BUY zone just beneath ($86.40/share). Just too much uncertainty for me to do this, however.

I see several other weaknesses with ANF. EPS projections are very inconsistent with only three available ranging from 1.2% – 10.0%. Sales forecasts are weak. Visual inspection, as mentioned at the top, is choppy. Historical EPS distribution is very wide leading me to question the reliability of a higher initial value ($10.69 in ’25 is 72% YOY growth). Even the stock price is highly volatile falling 48% over the last year while zooming ~400% over the last three years. Quality stock prospects are all about stability; this is not that.

Per U/D, ANF is a BUY under $78.60. Given a forecast high price just under $156, BI TAR criterion is met ~ $78/share.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

Getting Off the Schneid (Part 2)

The current title pays homage to this post. Today I recap 2024 efforts, what I have done since, and where I hope to go next.

Although you may not have noticed (as explained here), I am about five months behind in blogging. A quick count reveals that I did 123 stock studies in 2024 all posted here. My last study was in November (actually October).

Since then, I suppose my brain has been recharging?

All I know is that I’m overdue for more stock studies [updates] and delinquent in regular maintenance of my personal stock portfolio. I can’t blame the library’s technical difficulties for putting a halt to my 2024 stock studies. Part of the excuse would be the more difficult endeavor of finding new stocks with bullish prospects at reasonable prices when the market is at all-time highs (ATH).

The market is now in correction and I’m caught with my pants down while some good buys are definitely available. Kudos to me for not exhibiting herd behavior and buying stocks hand over fist with the market at ATH or falling prey to FOMO (fear of missing out) as momentum carries valuations stratospheric. Demerits for not buying when the market corrects or crashes and “blood is in the streets.” Not keeping up with my stock studies or pounce list means I am in no position to do so. Lots has been written on market cycles in books like these.

Borrowing from Part 1:

     > First things first: write this post. Since I haven’t blogged in what seems like
     > ages, it took a herculean effort to do basics like login to WordPress, get into
     > my blog folder, search the title index for links, remember what to do with
     > tags, etc. These tasks are automatic when I’m doing them multiple times
     > per week but after four months away, a chisel is needed for newfound rust.
     >
     > I can now be the last, probably, to say Happy New Year to everyone!
     > Greetings after a long hiatus.

My respite is well-deserved. The original intent was to post twice weekly. I doubled that once I started doing daily stock studies. Posting twice weekly might have left me right on schedule.

I have been much more productive during this blog hiatus than the last. Back in the day, I was a religious follower of the tastytrade production Market Measures (MM). Excepting those unknowingly missed, I watched every single episode through mid-2019. Over the last few months, I have binge-watched the last 5.5+ years of MM content (up to two months worth of episodes per day).

I will continue next time by starting to take a closer look at particular MM content that can potentially reshape and guide my future approach to option trading (which I still do, believe it or not!).

ULTA Stock Study (10-15-25)

I recently did a stock study on Ulta Beauty, Inc. (ULTA, $541.01). Previous studies are here, here, here, and here.

M* writes:

     > Ulta Beauty is the largest specialized beauty retailer in the US
     > with about 1,500 freestanding stores. The firm offers cosmetics
     > (39% of 2024 sales), fragrances (13%), skin care (23%), and hair
     > care products (19%). It also has salon services, including hair,
     > makeup, skin, and brow, that account for about 4% of its revenue
     > and drive traffic. Outside of the US, Ulta acquired premium beauty
     > retailer Space NK and its 83 stores in the UK and Ireland in 2025,
     > is opening franchised stores in Mexico, and has formed a joint
     > venture to expand into the Middle East. In addition, Ulta collects
     > royalties through its Target partnership (set to end in 2026) and
     > credit card revenue.

Over the past decade, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 12.0% and 19.5%. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for a sales+EPS dip in ’21 and EPS dip in ’25 [FY ends Jan 31; references to year from Value Line (VL) and BI website incremented to match]. Five- (10-) year EPS R^2 is 0.63 (0.54) and VL gives an Earnings Predictability score of 45.

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer and industry averages by increasing from 12.9% (’16) to 14.0% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 12.8%. ROE also leads peer and industry averages by increasing from 20.3% (’16) to 50.5% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 46.5%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from 0% (’16) to 43.6% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 48.4%.

Current Ratio is 1.39 and Quick Ratio is 0.21 per M* who assigns a “Narrow” Economic Moat, rates the company “Exemplary” for Capital Allocation, and gives a B grade for Financial Health. VL gives a B++ rating for Financial Strength. Interest Coverage is undefined as the company has no long-term debt.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting below the range at 5.0%.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 5.0% per year forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 7.9%). I will use ’25 EPS of $25.34/share as the initial value rather than 2026 Q2 EPS of $26.08 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 21.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E falls from 37.8 (’16) to 22.7 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 22.2 (excluding 99.8 upside outlier in ’21) and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 18.1 (also excluding ’21 low P/E). I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 12.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E falls from 24.2 (’16) to 12.6 (’25) with a last-5-year mean (excluding 39.9 upside outlier in ’21) of 14.1. I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $304.10 is default based on initial value given above. This is 43.8% less than the last closing price and 1.6% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land ULTA in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 0.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 4.7%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of NEGATIVE 0.3% is unacceptable as a potential stock investment. With a healthy margin of safety (MOS) I can proceed based on TAR, but even that is less than I seek from a large-size company.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 96 studies (my study and 21 outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 4.5%, 5.8%, 21.8, and 14.1, respectively. I am lower except for sales (5.0%). VL’s projected average annual P/E of 18.0 is about equal to MS and higher than mine (16.5).

MS high / low EPS are $34.00 / $25.36 versus my $32.34 / $25.34 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL’s high EPS of $34.60 is greater than both.

MS LSPF of $350.50 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 13.8: less than the above-stated 14.1. MS LSPF is 2.0% less than the default $25.36/share * 14.1 = $357.58 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is 15.3% greater than mine, however.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 3.0 and 4.0 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: significantly overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is slightly elevated at 1.14.

MOS is robust because my inputs are near or below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. MS TAR of 6.7% is 2.0% per year greater than mine.

VL notes the stock has surged ~40% since being upgraded to Timeliness rank of 1 in mid-May.

Per U/D, ULTA is a BUY under $412/share. BI TAR criterion is met ~ $339 given a forecast high price ~$679 (no dividend).

Disclaimer: I own shares in this security.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

CPRT Stock Study (10-14-25)

I recently did a stock study on Copart, Inc. (CPRT, $44.07). The previous study is here.

M* writes:

     > Based in Dallas, Copart operates an online salvage vehicle auction
     > with operations in 11 countries across North America, Europe, and the
     > Middle East, facilitating over 3.5 million transactions annually. The
     > company utilizes its virtual bidding platform, VB3, to connect vehicle
     > sellers with over 750,000 registered buyers around the world. Buyers
     > primarily consist of vehicle dismantlers, rebuilders, individuals
     > and used vehicle retailers. About 80% of Copart’s vehicle volume is
     > supplied by auto insurance companies holding vehicles deemed a
     > total loss. Copart also offers services such as vehicle transportation,
     > storage, title transfer, and salvage value estimation. The company
     > primarily operates on a consignment basis and collects fees based
     > on the vehicle’s final selling price.

Over the past decade [FY ends Jul 31], this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 16.2% and 21.3%. Lines are textbook up, straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 95.

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer/industry averages while increasing from 31.2% (’16) to 40.8% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 40.3%. ROE also leads peer/industry averages despite falling from 30.4% (’16) to 17.5% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 22.3%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer/industry averages while falling from 45.3% (’16) to 1.1% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 4.0%.

Quick Ratio is 8.1 and Interest Coverage is N/A (debt-free as of FY 2025) per M* who gives a Financial Health grade of A (per BI website), rates the company “Standard” for Capital Allocation, and assigns a “Wide” Economic Moat. VL grades the company B++ for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 3.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 6.0% forecast is near bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 9.4%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $1.59/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 23.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E increases from 23.2 (’16) to 40.5 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 38.6 and last-5-year-mean average P/E of 31.8. I am near bottom of the range (only 19.4 in ’17 is less).

My Forecast Low P/E is 17.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E increases from 14.6 (’16) to 28.4 (’25) with a last-5-year-mean of 25.1. I am forecasting toward bottom of the range (only ’16 and 14.9 in ’17 are less).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is $31.00. Default $27.00 based on initial value from above seems unreasonably low at 38.7% (38.2%) less than the previous close (52-week low). My arbitrary selection is 29.7% (29.1%) less.

These inputs land CPRT in the SELL zone with a U/D ratio of 0.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 2.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of NEGATIVE 0.7% is not viable as an investment candidate. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR but even that is less than current risk-free rate (T-bills).

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 147 studies (my study and 38 other outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 10.1%, 10.5%, 35.6, and 23.1, respectively. I am much lower across the board. VL’s projected average annual P/E of 33.0 is higher than MS (29.4) and much higher than mine (20.0).

MS high / low EPS are $2.57 / $1.52 versus my $2.13 / $1.59 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower forecast growth rate. VL’s high EPS is less than both at $2.00.

MS LSPF of $35.70 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 23.5: greater than the above-stated 23.1. MS LSPF is 1.7% greater than the default $1.52/share * 23.1 = $35.11, which results in more aggressive zoning. MS LSPF is also 15.2% greater than mine.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.7 and 4.3 (low growth rate) per M* and my projected P/E, respectively: overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is slightly low at 0.86.

MOS is robust because my inputs are near or below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. This is supported by an MS TAR 12.5% per year greater than my 2.1%.

I can entertain the possibility that my study is unreasonably conservative. My forecast growth rates are low and my forecast future P/E is exceedingly low. While the market places more of a premium on this stock over time, it’s almost like I refuse to move it into the 10-year range. For other context, M* and CFRA currently rate the stock with 4 and 5 stars, respectively. For VL, it’s “above average” with regard to long-term capital appreciation. The stock is now trading at a price first seen in ’23 but my study wouldn’t even consider touching it.

Per U/D, CPRT is a BUY under $32.50/share. Given forecast high price of $49, the BI TAR criterion [double in five years] is met at $24.50 (no dividend).

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FIVE Stock Study (10-13-25)

I recently did a stock study on Five Below, Inc. (FIVE) $138.49. Previous studies are here, here, and here.

M* writes:

     > Five Below Inc is a specialty value retailer offering merchandise targeted
     > at the tween and teen demographic. The Company’s edited assortment of
     > products includes select brands and licensed merchandise.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 19.2% and 19.6%, respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dips in ’21, ’23, and ’25 [FY ends Jan 31; references to year at BI and Value Line (VL) incremented to align]. Five- (10-) year EPS R^2 is 0.46 (0.86) and VL gives an Earnings Predictability score of 60.

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer/industry averages while ranging from 7.8% in ’21 to 12.9% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 10.4%. ROE leads peer/industry averages despite falling from 28.7% (’16) to 15.7% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 25.0%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer/industry averages with a last-5-year mean of 53.3% (no long-term debt per VL).

Quick Ratio is 0.73 and Interest Coverage is N/A (consistent with no long-term debt) per M* who gives a Financial Health grade of C (per BI website) and assigns no Economic Moat. VL grades the company B++ for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 9.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 2.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six is 6.9%, but in case of duplicate mean of five is 8.3%). I will use ’25 EPS of $4.60/share as the initial value rather than 2026 Q2 $4.94 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 39.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E increases from 39.5 (’16) to 46.1 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 44.2 (excluding 89.8 in ’21) and last-5-year-mean average P/E of 33.7. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 20.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E decreases from 25.7 (’16) to 14.1 (’25) with a last-5-year-mean of 23.3. I am forecasting toward bottom of the range (only ’25 is less).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $92.00 is default based on initial value from above. This is 33.6% less than the previous close but 75.6% greater than the 52-week low.

These inputs land FIVE in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 1.6% is less than the current risk-free rate (T-bills). If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead (still less than I seek for a medium-size company).

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 42 studies (my study and 7 outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 10.5%, 8.3%, 30.0, and 21.1, respectively. I am much higher on Forecast High P/E but lower on the others. VL’s projected average annual P/E of 30.0 is higher than MS (25.6) and mine (29.5).

MS high / low EPS are $7.29 / $4.77 versus my $5.08 / $4.60 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower forecast growth rate. VL’s high EPS is in the middle at $6.25.

MS LSPF of $87.70 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 18.4: less than the above-stated 21.1. MS LSPF is 12.9% less than the default $4.77/share * 21.1 = $100.65, which results in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is also 4.7% less than mine.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 2.0 and 13.7 (low growth rate) per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: both overvalued (M* has 1.2: fairly valued). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is slightly low at 0.83.

MOS is moderate because my inputs are near or below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages with one glaring exception. This is supported by an MS TAR 1.8% per year greater than my 9.2%.

The glaring exception is MS Forecast High P/E. Eleven studies (almost 25% of the total) use numbers in the 20s with four being 22.5 – 25.0. With the lowest value in 10 years being 39.5 and a last-10-year mean Forecast LOW P/E of 24.0, I think these MS numbers are unreasonably low.

Per U/D, FIVE is a BUY under $118/share. Given forecast high price ~$198, the BI TAR criterion [double in five years] is met ~$99 (no dividend).

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BFAM Stock Study (10-11-25)

I recently did a stock study on Bright Horizons Family Solutions (BFAM) with a closing price of $97.58.

M* writes:

     > Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc provider of [sic] early education and
     > child care, family care solutions, and workforce education services that help
     > working families and client employees personally and professionally. It
     > provides services under multi-year contracts with employers that offer
     > early education and child care, back-up care, and educational advisory
     > services as part of their employee benefits package. The company has three
     > business segments; full-service center-based child care, backup care, and
     > educational advisory services. The majority of the revenue is generated
     > by full-service center-based child care, which includes traditional center-
     > based child care and early education services. Other services provided
     > by the company include in-home child and elder care, and Others.

Over the past 10 years, this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 5.4% and -2.8%, respectively. Lines are up, mostly straight, and parallel since ’20 but a huge COVID-related decline makes for the negative long-term growth rate [I actually don’t think it’s negative because $1.50/share * (1.0536 ^ 9) = $2.40/share from ’15 to ’24 corresponding to a +5.4% annualized growth rate]. 2020 aside, only ’23 shows [EPS] decline. Five- (10-) year EPS R^2 is 0.82 (0.02) and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 55.

Over the past decade, PTPM trails peer and industry averages while decreasing from 9.6% (’15) to 7.4% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 4.8%. ROE leads peer and industry averages despite falling from 12.6% (’15) to 9.9% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 6.4%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages while ranging from 56.3% (’15) to 65.1% (’19) with a last-5-year mean of 60.5%.

Quick Ratio is 0.45 and Interest Coverage is 6.5 per M* who gives a Financial Health grade of B (per BI website). and assigns a “Narrow” (quantitative) Economic Moat. VL grades the company B+ for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 6.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 12.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of four: 16.7%). I will use ’24 EPS of $2.40/share as the initial value rather than 2025 Q2 $3.05 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 36.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E increases from 46.1 (’15) to 59.1 (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 99.3 (excluding 394 in ’20) and last-5-year-mean average P/E of 77.8 (also excluding 143 low P/E in ’20). I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 32.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E increases from 29.2 (’15) to 38.2 (’24) with a last-5-year-mean of 56.4. I am forecasting toward bottom of the range [only ’15 and ’17 (25.1) are less].

My Low Stock Price Forecast of $76.80 is default based on initial value from above. This is 21.3% less than the previous close and 19.6% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land BFAM in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 9.3%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 8.1% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I usually compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS) but mine is the only study showing up on the BI website.

With regard to VL, I am more conservative. VL projects a future average annual P/E of 32.0 versus my 34.0 and high EPS of $6.60/share versus my $4.23. This contributes to a forecast high price of $255/share versus ~$152 for me.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 3.7 and 2.4 per M* and my projected P/E, respectively: both overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is fire-sale low at 0.32 [but suspect because I can’t completely rationalize the seemingly inflated values after ’20 that may be slowly coming back to earth].

MOS is at least moderate in the current study because my inputs are near or less than respective analyst/historical ranges. Without MS weighing in, I am reticent to pronounce this “robust.”

I can’t overlook an argument to say visual inspection fails for this company. We allegedly have a negative 10-year EPS growth rate and even though I think that should be positive, only since ’24 has ’15 been exceeded. That’s a long period of apparent stagnation (despite YOY growth in most instances).

Also on the questionable side is financial strength: debt-to-capital >> 33%, Quick Ratio < 1.0, and so-so Interest Coverage.

Per U/D, BFAM is a BUY under $95/share. Given forecast high price of $152.30, the BI TAR criterion [double in five years] is met ~$76 (no dividend).

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* — I can’t explain CFRA’s apparent EPS disconnect in 2025 and beyond.

MRK Stock Study (9-22-25)

I recently did a stock study on Merck & Co., Inc. (MRK) with a closing price of $81.51. The previous study is here.

M* writes:

     > Merck makes pharmaceutical products to treat several conditions in a number
     > of therapeutic areas, including cardiometabolic disease, cancer, and
     > infections. Within cancer, the firm’s immuno-oncology platform, led by
     > Keytruda, is a major contributor to overall sales. The company also has a
     > substantial vaccine business aimed at preventing pediatric diseases, as
     > well as Gardasil for human papillomavirus. Additionally, Merck sells animal
     > health-related drugs. From a geographical perspective, 47% of the company’s
     > sales are generated from US human health (pharmaceuticals and vaccines).

Over the past 10 years, the mega-size ( > $50B annual revenue) company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 6.0% and 5.2%, respectively. Lines are mostly up and straight except for YOY EPS declines in ’16, ’17, ’20, and ’23 (large). Ten- (Five-) year EPS R^2 is only 0.02 (0.03) [both jump to 0.79 with ’23 excluded], and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 40.

Over the past decade, PTPM trails peer and industry averages despite increasing from 13.7% (’15) to 31.1% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 21.7%. ROE also trails peer and industry averages despite increasing from 9.5% (’15) to 38.3% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 26.0%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from 37.2% (’15) to 44.5% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 47.0%.

Quick Ratio is 0.8 and Interest Coverage is 16 per M* who assigns a “Wide” Economic Moat and “Standard” Capital Allocation. VL gives an A rating for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 2.0% forecast is bottom of the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 8.0% forecast is just below the range of seven long-term estimates (mean 10.4%). Initial value is 2025 Q2 EPS of $6.49/share rather than ’24 EPS of $6.74.

My Forecast High P/E is 18.0. Over the past decade, high P/E falls from 38.9 in ’15 to 20.0 in ’24 with a last-5-year mean of 22.5 (excluding 855 in ’24) and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 19.2. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 10.0. Over the past decade, low P/E falls from 27.9 in ’15 to 14.0 in ’24 with a last-5-year mean of 15.8 (excluding 688 in ’23). I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default value of $64.90. This is 20.4% less than previous closing price and 11.5% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past decade, Payout Ratio (PR) declines from 116% in ’15 to 46.3% in ’24 with a last-5-year mean of 59.7% (excluding 2114% in ’23). I am forecasting below the entire range at 40.0%.

These inputs land MRK in the BUY zone with an U/D ratio of 5.4. The Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 18.3%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 13.2% is solid for a mega-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on the total annualized return (TAR) of 18.3% instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 150 studies (my study and 23 outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 4.6%, 9.8%, 18.4, 12.0, and 40.0%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL’s projected average annual P/E of 13.0 is less than MS (15.2) and less than mine (14.0).

MS high / low EPS are $10.74 / $6.52 versus my $9.54 / $6.49 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL’s $11.70 [high EPS] soars above both.

MS LSPF of $69.10 implies Forecast Low P/E of 10.6: less than the above-stated 12.0. MS LSPF is 11.7% less than the default $6.52/share * 12.0 = $78.24 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 6.5% greater than mine.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.5 and 0.84 per my projected P/E and Zacks, respectively: slightly undervalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is cheap at 0.66.

MOS is robust because my inputs are near or below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. This is further corroberated by an MS TAR 16.0% per year greater than my 18.3%.

Per U/D, MRK is a BUY under $91.60/share. Given a forecast high of $171.60, a 171.6 * ((1 – ((15.0 – 2.2) / 100)) ^ 5)
~ $86.50/share target price meets the BI TAR criterion.

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* — Google AI reports: “while there is no fixed period for the ‘long-term growth’ (LTG) forecast
       on a London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) detailed stock report, it typically reflects an average
       estimate over a three- to five-year time frame. This forecast horizon can vary depending on the
       analyst or research firm providing the data.”