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Why Options? (Part 5)

Today I will continue advancing the case for options by presenting two additional advantages to trading them.

The fourth advantage to trading options is their ability to lower cost basis (CB) of stock. CB is the amount paid for an investment and to be honest, this is really an accounting designation rather than an official tax designation. Whether one classifies sold premium as lowering expenses or increasing revenue, the effects are very real. To put this in Real Estate terms, options allow me to “rent out” my stock by selling option premium in exchange for the obligation to sell the stock at a particular price if the stock moves higher. In selling the stock I realize the profit. If the stock does not rise to the strike price then I may repeat the process to further lower my CB.

With stock alone, the only way to really lower CB is by waiting for it to fall and buying more to lower the average CB of all shares (dollar cost averaging). One could consider dividends to lower CB as well. If the stock pays dividends then I can often sell premium against it as a second means to lower CB.

The last advantage I will describe of trading options is probably the most exciting: position adjustment to match the underlying trend. Once I buy stock shares, my choices are to sell some shares, sell all shares, or buy more shares. I basically either hope the stock goes higher or choose to cut downside losses by getting out. Option adjustments can allow me to profit when the trend turns sideways or even lower. The potential adjustments are almost limitless to ride these changing trends. This is a blessing and a curse because while choices are good, there is no “one best adjustment.” Either way, many option traders live for this opportunity to adjust if needed.

Some concluding remarks in my next installment…

Why Options? (Part 4)

After getting past an option myth and finally mentioning some option truths, today I will begin talking about some advantages to trading options.

What follows is content that few people in the financial industry will tell you about.

First, options allow for cost efficiency:  the ability to almost mimic a stock position at a big cost savings.  Consider stock replacement as an example.  Purchasing 400 shares of a $40 stock costs $16,000.  Purchasing four $10 calls may be done for $4,000.  Since one option contract represents 100 stock shares, this is a very similar position.  The leftover $12,000 can stay safely in cash or be used for another position.

A second advantage is that options offer a limited-risk alternative. A long option position can never lose more than its original cost. In the previous example if the stock goes to zero then the stock position would lose $16,000 whereas the option position would only lose $4,000.

Advantage #3: options can succeed where stop-losses can fail. Suppose XYZ is purchased for $50 with a stop-loss order entered at $45 to prevent loss of greater than 10%. After the close, XYZ announces allegations of high crimes among the upper management. Next morning, stock opens at $20 and the stop-loss order triggers immediately for a 60% loss.

Now consider the purchase of a $45 put instead of placing that stop-loss order. The put does cost a few dollars whereas the stop-loss order is free. As with any insurance, though, you get what you pay for. The most you can lose on the put is the price paid but it will hold (gain) its value point-for-point for each dollar below $45 the stock falls. In addition, a volatility spike in the midst of a huge selloff would cause the put to increase even more.

I will continue discussion of option advantages in the next post.

Why Options? (Part 3)

This blog series is focused on making the positive case for option trading.  In the last installment, I gave some historical backing for why the financial industry may be telling us that options are too risky.

The suggestion that options are “too risky” is, in my opinion, complete myth. From http://www.marketwatch.com/story/5-options-trading-myths-2012-05-07:

“Myth #1: Options are too risky
This myth has survived for centuries because some people have misused options… [which has given] them a bad name.”

From http://www.dailyworth.com/posts/2476-how-risky-is-it-to-invest-in-options:

“Options have the unfair reputation of being considered riskier than other investment vehicles… in a book written by a well-respected duo of female financial advisors… Whereas they consider stocks to be moderate-risk investments, they include options in the high-risk category along with junk bonds, highly leveraged real estate and penny stocks.”

Some truth about options is given in The Rookie’s Guide to Options (2008) by Mark Wolfinger:

“Options were designed to be risk-reducing tools.”

“[Options] are used to hedge risk, so the myth that options are too risky is not true.”

“Options are risky if you don’t understand how to use them… but by themselves, options are not risky… the real risk is with the options trader.”

In the next post, I will begin discussing some benefits to options as a trading vehicle.

Why Options? (Part 2)

I’m just getting started with a new blog series aiming to make the case for options trading.

Options are tradable instruments of value that represent rights to ownership or sale of the underlying stock or future.

I do not believe society’s fear and reluctance toward options can be understood without knowing about the debacle of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM): a hedge-fund management company that employed options in its trading portfolio. On the LTCM board of directors were Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, who shared the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics for a new options pricing model. Over its first three years, LTCM posted net gains of 21%, 43%, and 41%.

In 1998, LTCM lost $4.6 billion over a 4-month span. LTCM did business with many key financial firms. Wall Street feared a LTCM failure could cause a chain reaction, which might cause catastrophic losses throughout the financial system. As a result, the Federal Reserve supervised an agreement among 16 financial institutions for a $3.6 billion bailout.

While being supervised by the very deans of options pricing (Merton and Scholes), the trading approach failed!

From http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html?pagewanted=print: “A financial firm borrows billions… to make big bets on esoteric securities. Markets turn and the bets go sour. Overnight, the firm loses most of its money… Fearing that… collapse could set off a full-scale market meltdown, the U.S. government… encourages private interests to bail it out. The firm isn’t Bear Stearns — it was LTCM… and the rescue occurred 10 years ago this month.”

“The LTCM fiasco momentarily shocked Wall Street out of its complacent trust in financial models, and was replete with lessons… But the lessons were ignored, and in this decade, the mistakes were repeated with far more harmful consequences. Instead of learning from the past, Wall Street has re-enacted it in larger form, in the mortgage… credit crisis.”

The financial industry sends a clear message: trading options is like making a deal with the devil.

Is this understandable based on the historical arrogance and mistakes of highly-respected professionals?

Why Options? (Part 1)

I’ll admit it:  as a full-time, independent, retail trader, I think options are the way to go.

I actually believe that trading options is better than trading stocks or futures.  This would be very, very difficult to prove, though.  When it gets down to the trading system, whether discretionary or systematic, it would be extremely difficult to convince anyone that options are unequivocally better.

I certainly think I can do things trading options that I cannot do trading anything else.

In this blog series, I’ll settle for demonstrating why trading options is not as bad as most people think.

Aim high?  The Air Force does but I am aiming lower.

I will not make the case for options as best.

I will not make the case for options as better.

I will only make the case for options being not as bad as everyone thinks they are.  Even this could be a paradigm shift just waiting to happen.

SysCW: Fraud or Failsafe? (Part 3)

I am wrapping up this long series on CC/CSP trading with a focus on Rich MacDuff’s SysCW trading service.

I continue with content from the SysCW on-line forum.
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> Why not just start small with 10 positions and do ten buy-writes and see
> how it works for you and then slowly graduate into more… and once you
> have experience with selling calls than learn about collars and adjusting
> trades along the way to create a money machine.

I don’t believe there is any such thing as a “money machine” in the world of trading. You are going to have good times and periods of loss. If you never have a big loss then you’re extremely lucky (i.e. people do occasionally win the lottery) and perhaps more hobbyist than someone who trades full-time for a living. Never expect a money machine despite what select proprietors tell you. That encourages trading too large, which can put yourself at great risk for catastrophic loss.

> It becomes really fun and very simple after awhile.

Everything about CCs and CSPs has been fun over the last few years. Same goes for pretty much long anything. What matters with regard to a viable strategy is how it fares during the toughest of times. The toughest of times are easily “out of sight, out of mind” when the going is good. When the going is good, the toughest of times are hard to remember or recreate but this is precisely what we must do when properly researching a trading system.

> Sorry if I didn’t answer your questions. I’m sure Rich will chime in.
> But it sounds like fear is your greatest concern.

Fear should be everyone’s greatest concern until all moving parts are identified, pieced together, and making sense.
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My goal is not to debunk SysCW. My goal is to better understand it and put myself in a good position to evaluate its merits as a comprehensive trading system.

I encourage you to explore and to do the same.

SysCW: Fraud or Failsafe? (Part 2)

Last time I inched the spotlight away from CCs and CSPs and onto Rich MacDuff’s SysCW trading service. I will conclude this blog mini-series with some content from the SysCW on-line forum.

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I see two major hazards. First is the [black swan] market crash…

Second is the “trap,” where I have an Interim trade (maybe a Weekly option that is collecting “juicy” premium) and the market suddenly catapults higher. Now, that juicy weekly premium is irrelevant because I need to search months to years out in time to roll for a credit. In backtesting I have seen cases where no credit opportunity exists (like Vegas with its maximum bet on blackjack tables, all optionable stocks have a longest-duration option series available). My remaining options are:

–Roll for a debit and hope (hope is not a viable market strategy)
–Dollar cost average (cannot do this if I am fully invested, which Rich has most recently started to recommend)
–Accept assignment and realize the loss

In 2008 where everything tanked, all of my positions would be Interim trades. In 2009 when the V-bottom printed, I could be trapped on most or all of my positions and forced to lock in huge losses across the board.

That is my biggest concern with SysCW.

> Why not just start small with 10 positions and do ten buy writes and see how it
> works for you and then slowly graduate into more.

That is fair… 10 positions in an account that could handle 20, for example. While the Math Exercise looks for 15% annualized return, though, I would only be realizing 7.5% annualized overall. I will increase allocation over time but ultimately the question remains as to how much I can increase because Rich says I should be making 15% annualized on the whole account.

One way or another, the question about whether or not to be fully invested must be answered. If not then how much cash sits idle on the sidelines? In this case with the Math Exercise targeting 15% annualized on every position then the transparent reality is a system unable to deliver on its promises. Period.
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I will continue in the next post.

SysCW: Fraud or Failsafe? (Part 1)

The time has arrived to gradually transition away from covered calls and cash secured puts and to focus specifically on “Systematic Covered Writing.”

Is SysCW a viable trading system or is it a Rich MacDuff fraud?

In the last post I provided a partial listing of Rich MacDuff catch phrases taken from his e-mails to subscribers. The underlying tone is one of arrogance, of simplicity, of sarcasm to emphasize outsized returns… he makes SysCW sound like an ATM machine. Hardly ever a mention of anything negative and certainly little to nothing about risk or losing.

The most infamous money manager to never post a losing month was arguably Bernie Madoff. He is now serving a 150-year prison sentence for fraud (among other things).

I believe there is no such thing as a money machine in the world of trading. As a trader, I will have good times and I will have losses. If I never have a big loss then I am extremely lucky. If I never have a big loss then I may also be trading as a hobby rather than trading full-time for a living where I must trade in larger size and risk more money to pay the monthly bills.

Despite what some people say, never expect a “money machine” in the world of trading. Such a false expectation encourages trading too large and putting oneself at great risk for catastrophic loss.

When you see blatant arrogance like this surrounding anything financial, the best course of action is probably to turn the other way and run as fast as you can without ever stopping to look back.

Few things scream “OPTIONSCAM.COM!!!!!” any louder than this.

Covered Calls and Cash Secured Puts (Part 41)

I am winding up this blog series with concerns about Systematic Covered Writing (SysCW) as a viable trading system.

Directly or indirectly, Rich MacDuff often refers to SysCW as a “money machine.” When you order his book Systematic Covered Writing (2011), he offers a free one-month trial to his service. I maintained a collection of “catch phrases” from his e-mails:

> It always boils down to the math… since November 18th, this CLF
> investment has generated cash at 60.43% when annualized… what if
> we end the year with only half that return… would it really
> matter what the stock is trading for at the time?

> We know that we will not go broke establishing positions that generate
> cash at an annualized rate 52.61%, which is exactly what we did. Wahoo.

> We will be playing this bad boy again!

> Some returns are ridiculous!… I hope you don’t blame me…

> This will be a one word commentary …SWEET!

> …we elected to allow an ‘interim call’ to be exercised because there is
> nothing wrong with a position that ends with an annualized gain of 70.80%.
> (Duh!) … It was not a hard decision to make.

> We are being paid for owning stock even though we were ‘wrong’ at the time
> of purchase. It’s all good. Kind of like the Seahawks! (I spend the bulk
> of my adult life in the Seattle area … what fun!)

> Such is the nature of the Weekly Strategy. We have to trade more often,
> but we are rewarded with more control and more cash. Got to love it.

> …options all expire this Friday. This means we will have an opportunity
> next Monday to either write calls against stock that is assigned, or
> establish new csp positions. Over and over … we generate cash.

Take a good look at the underlying tone here. I will continue discussion on this matter in my next post.

Covered Calls and Cash Secured Puts (Part 40)

To implement DCA in a market crash, spare cash would be required. The 15% annualized return MacDuff advertises with the Math Exercise would no longer apply because the deleveraged portfolio would be making less. How does this add up?

More recently, MacDuff has advised being fully invested. This eliminates the possibility of DCA and potentially resolves the discrepancy described above.

What happens when stocks tank?

On the call side I can sell premium at near-the-money strikes, which will enable me to continue generating cash.

What happens when a V-bottom prints (e.g. March 10, 2009) and stocks catapult higher through my lowered strikes?

MacDuff argues we are now better prepared for this situation thanks to narrower strike availability and weekly options that offer the potential for supercharged annualized returns.

What happens when I have to look months to years out in time to roll for a credit? Neither weeklies nor narrower strikes are going to save me.

In some cases, no available options will provide for a credit roll. I cannot take assignment at the [substantially] lowered strike because that would lock in a big loss. In 2009, I suspect this might have described most [if not all] of my positions.

My only other option would be to roll for a debit and hope the market cooperates and allows me to escape whole. “Hope is not a trading strategy” and I cannot begin to imagine my degree of insomnia if most of my positions were in that boat.

Until and unless MacDuff can give me some response to these difficult issues, I will have significant doubts about SysCW. One may argue “no trading system is perfect and losses are a part of the game” but MacDuff never shows any losses in his book nor in his tutorials.

How Madoff-esque is that?

Furthermore, what I have described here is more than “occasional losses.” What I have described is catastrophic loss running rampant across most of the portfolio. This is a risk that deserves a response and a remedy before SysCW qualifies as a viable trading system.