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Trading Epic Fury (Part 13)

Now on the other side of Epic Fury recovery, I discuss the bullish case in Part 12 with regard to news and technical analysis. The latter is a potential trigger to get positive delta.

It’s hard to be sure, but over the last few years it feels like I have lost money with short calls. I often close a call and sell a put(s) to cover the cost. This masks the loss and unless I sell more puts and take on more downside exposure, my overall return will lag. The maneuver effectively extends time required to realize the initial profit thereby diluting annualized return.

The latter is juxtaposed with the benefit of otherwise wasting upside margin. Maintaining permanent downside exposure gives me the opportunity to take on some upside [exposure] with no additional [portfolio] margin requirement. Perhaps I might as well even if it’s limited [which unfortunately was not the case on too many candles beyond the Part 12 chart’s left arrow].

Whether or not I have actually lost money selling calls, looking at the bear markets and market corrections since 2008 makes it clear that recoveries have generally been quick (courtesy Google AI):

COVID is the fastest recovery from a 30%+ decline in history. Epic Fury is shallower and takes only a couple weeks to recover. Previous declines in 2018 and 2015-16 are also swift once the bottom is reached. Moral of the story: when the train leaves the station, I better be aboard.

What I am about to discuss would have worked for Epic Fury. Based on these quick recovery times, I suspect it would have also worked for other declines. It will be instructive to revisit these periods, though, to assess the worrisome whipsaw potential. I worry about removing upside exposure in favor of [more] downside only to immediately see the previous low taken out. That can devastate NLV and result in catastrophic loss.

Technicals can help determine when the train starts rolling. My gut feel (probably worth very little) tells me that while [price closes above the] 50- and 200-SMA are good recovery indicators, my trading may require a shorter period. This certainly applies to Epic Fury where I employed shorter and shorter-dated options including many at 0-1 DTE. The 20-SMA, reclaimed two candles before that [Part 12] left arrow, seems better suited and a significant event in and of itself being the first time since Epic Fury the market actually closes above [the 20-SMA or middle Bollinger Band].

I will continue next time.

Trading Epic Fury (Part 12)

With Marco Rubio now proclaiming Epic Fury over, I want to wrap up my qualitative trading analysis because things did not end up well for me.

Things were going well as of Mar 30 (see Part 6). Since then, we have gotten:

The left arrow is Mar 31: first trading day after my Part 6 post. The right arrow is Apr 8. From a technical standpoint, the 20-SMA is reclaimed two candles earlier. Apr 8 reclaims the 50- and 200-SMA and the upper Bollinger Band is breached one day later on Apr 9. In retrospect, it’s clear by this point the rally is on.

In the moment with all the news swirling about, we don’t know the coast is on its way to being clear at the left arrow. Uncertainty reigns especially with many believing nothing the President says can be trusted because of how often he flips, contradicts himself, etc. Isn’t such the case with any politician, though?

For the sake of trading alone, the best advice is probably to ignore news altogether. I failed here by making a point to watch the nightly news regularly then switching to “Iran updates” online to get more “timely” reports. News varies by source and even by content and origination date as time progresses. History changes and evolves.

In contrast, technicals and day-of-the-week references are persistent and historically reliable. Technical analysis may be notoriously bad when it comes to prediction but with regard to retrospective trading post-mortem, it is a good yardstick to use. I give seasonal and technical rationale for the bull case in Part 9 and Part 10 (actually written on Apr 6).

Short calls were good to me until they weren’t during Epic Fury but over the last few years, it feels like I have lost money with them. Would respecting the stop-loss outperform a long-term campaign? Admittedly, campaigns aren’t terrible because eventually the market will fall enough to present loss-mitigation opportunity [probably coinciding with a desire to open more short calls for downside protection, unfortunately]. If the market makes an abrupt V-shaped recovery like it did here, though, then I’m caught with my pants down [probably being spanked pretty hard].

At the very least, short calls are somewhat tempting. During the campaign, I’ve made some money rolling the short calls for many months. Since I have no other upside margin, maybe it can’t hurt to continue.

Positive delta during the recovery would have been the panacea. It’s tough because leaning positive delta bleeds capital in a declining market, but at some point—either through a technical or stop-loss filter—those short calls might best be closed.

I will continue next time.

Understanding ROE (Part 8)

Today concludes the mini-series on return on equity (ROE) that has also discussed ROA, ROIC, and some case studies.

Probably the most important thing I have learned from writing this is how to deal with unconventional cases like BKNG, SBUX, and DPZ. For starters, look at shareholder equity (total assets – total liabilities)—also known as book value. If negative, then expect quirky ROE numbers like negative numbers or “too-good-to-be-true” triple digits because ROE becomes a [broken] ghost metric. As I have discussed, these are cases where ROA and/or ROIC might be better to study.

With such heavy mention of “shareholder equity” throughout this mini-series, I think it’s worthwhile to spend some time discussing that more common synonym often mentioned in financial writings.

For many different reasons, “book value” is often in quotation marks:

Shareholder equity is actual accounting book value, but the quotation marks are a warning label that the official number may hide the economic reality. It’s often just a starting point that may need heavy adjusting because it fails to reflect what a company is truly worth due to standard accounting rules. For example, massive value drivers like brand reputation, proprietary software, and trained workforces are almost always ignored in accounting book value. In practice, book value is often viewed as the bare minimum value [rather than its value as a growing business] if the company were to be shut down immediately.

As a result, analysts often move from the “actual” accounting number to an adjusted book value by revaluing [marking to market] tangible assets (e.g. land) to their current sale price, by cleaning up liabilities by adding off-balance sheet items or potential legal costs that haven’t yet been recognized, and by calculating book value/share subtracting preferred stock to reflect what common shareholders would receive.

Understanding ROE (Part 7)

In Part 6, I discussed the misleading return on equity (ROE) for SBUX. Today I want to look at Domino’s Pizza (DPZ).

According to Google AI, ROE for DPZ is as follows according to six different sources:

While negative ROE usually means a company is losing money, DPZ has negative shareholder equity rather than negative profit. The company has aggressively used debt to fund massive share buybacks and dividends. The “asset-light” model results in liabilities exceeding assets with a shareholder equity of -$3.9B. Net income (’25) is +$602M, though. Simply Wall Street notes that DPZ maintains a healthy interest coverage ratio of 4.9x to 5.3x suggesting it easily pays the interest on its debt.

Because DPZ ROE is distorted by negative shareholder equity like SBUX, we may look to ROA or return on invested capital (ROIC). ROA > 35% outperforms nearly all industry peers.

ROA seems “too good to be true” (see Part 4) and may also be distorted. ROA is high primarily because of an asset-light franchise model, not just raw profitability. Franchising means the massive real estate and equipment costs of 20,000+ locations are not on the balance sheet (total assets only $1.7B). Despite owning few stores, DPZ collects high-margin royalties and supply chain fees creating a relatively large net income divided by a very small asset base.

Articles at Business Model Mastery and Restaurant Business compare DPZ with McDonald’s (MCD): two companies with heavy debt but different asset structures leading to vastly different ROA. MCD ROA is 14.4% due to ownership of massive real estate. Owning land and buildings for most locations results in a $60B total assets leading some to describe MCD as a REIT disguised as a burger chain. Both have negative ROE (-478% for MCD) due to debt and share buybacks.

Where negative shareholder equity breaks ROE and an ultra-low asset base inflates ROA, DPZ ROIC remains stable. ROA uses net income in its numerator: after interest expenses are paid. DPZ has massive debt and huge interest payments that make the business look less efficient. ROIC ignores interest by using net operating profit after tax. This isolates the pizza business performance from the “noise” of how it is funded. ROA also falls prey to the “lazy cash” problem because total assets include things that don’t actually help make pizza (e.g. excess cash in a bank account, old unused equipment) that inflate the denominator and lower the score. ROIC ignores non-operating items thereby giving a tighter view of management’s skill.

Where ROA is better for asset-heavy firms like banks and factories, ROIC ~50-60% shows DPZ earning far more than its weighted average cost of capital (~9%) and therefore a significant value generator despite an unusual balance sheet.

Understanding ROE (Part 6)

In Part 5, I discussed the misleading return on equity (ROE) for BKNG. Today I want to look at Starbucks (SBUX).

Recall with BKNG that ROE can be confusing because:

Google AI reports SBUX 2026 ROE of -17%. ROE is +16% for ’25—a sharp decline from the 12-month average of +32%. Before shifting to negative shareholder equity (’19), its high positive ROE peaks > 386% in ’18 due to high leverage.

To illuminate and clarify, FinanceCharts.com (cited by Google AI) literally says:

      > The return on equity (roe) for Starbucks (SBUX) stock is 16.32% as of
      > Wednesday, April 22 2026. It’s worsened by -49.51% from its 12-month
      > average of 32.33%. The 5 year average return on equity (roe) is 43.04%.

Worsening by a negative value is the same as improving by the positive. 16.32% worsening by negative 49.51% means it has increased from a 12-month average of 16.32% – 49.51% = -33.19%: inconsistent with the above-stated +32.33%. I consider this a prime example of how broken some of these math algorithms can be when shareholder equity is negative.

Like BKNG, persistent negative equity is a result of deliberate capital allocation strategies. First, SBUX historically returns significant capital to shareholders via share buybacks often funded using debt. Second, SBUX maintains a streak of over 60 consecutive quarters of dividend payouts that further reduce shareholder equity. Finally, long-term debt has climbed to over $15B as the company invests in store expansions and its “Back to Starbucks” turnaround strategy.

Given the distortion in ROE, a stock analyst is advised to use other efficiency metrics. ROA (see Parts 3 and 4) is currently +4.3%. This measures profit against the total asset base rather than just shareholder equity. Return on Invested Capital (ROIC; see Part 2) is currently +6.8%. This is another more reliable metric for SBUX that accounts for both debt and equity.

For more details on financial health, Google AI suggests tracking SBUX ROE trends on Macrotrends or viewing quarterly growth performance on FinanceCharts.com. You can also read the latest valuation reports on Yahoo Finance or explore long-term return trends on Stock Analysis on Net (https://www.stock-analysis-on.net/).

I hope to conclude next time with one more case study.

Understanding ROE (Part 5)

I want to finish the mini-series by presenting some cases where return on equity (ROE) seems nonsensical and may be misinterpreted.

The first case is Booking Holdings (BKNG). Per Google AI, TTM ROE is 97% as of Apr 2026.

In my opinion, 97% ROE falls under the “too good to be true” category, but this is not unusual for BKNG. Pre-Pandemic (2019), ROE is a more “normal” but still strong 82%. In ’22, ROE is 110%, a sharp increase from previous years driven by recovery in travel demand and increased financial leverage. ROE fluctuates wildly from ’23–’25, often appearing highly positive (e.g. 156% in ’23).

ROE is a complex and potentially misleading metric for BKNG because it operates with negative shareholder equity. The impressive percentage turned up by some traditional screens is a mathematical quirk of having a negative denominator [recall (1) here]. BKNG reports shareholder equity of -$5.6B in ’25 largely driven by aggressive share buybacks and debt-financed capital allocation. The negative shareholder equity is not due to operational losses, though. In fact, BKNG remains highly profitable with $5.4B TTM net income.

Despite negative shareholder equity, some sites will report positive ROE due to a programming shortfall. It should be reported as a negative figure or “N/A.” Instead, sites like FinanceCharts.com use absolute values or specific internal logic to show a performance percentage when there really isn’t one. The positive percentage is a ghost metric.

Platforms such as Wisesheets.io report the same data as negative ROE or “N/A” following standard application of the formula with shareholder equity of -$5.6B (i.e. a shareholder deficit) at the end of 2025 divided into positive net income.

The reality is a highly profitable BKNG [$5.4B net income for ’25, as mentioned above] that has wiped out its equity book value through massive share buybacks rather than business losses. Negative equity is a deliberate management decision rather than a sign of operational failure.

For stock analysis when shareholder equity is negative, it can help to:

I will continue next time.

Understanding ROE (Part 4)

I left off Part 3 discussing some reasons it may be useful to study return on assets (ROA) as an alternative to return on equity (ROE). Today I will conclude by comparing the two metrics.

With regard to the math, ROA is:

                                Net Income * 100    
                              --------------------  
                              Average Total Assets             

Average Total Assets is the arithmetic mean between beginning and end of the year (or period). Note that ROE uses only shareholder equity in the denominator of its calculation.

ROA can mislead for companies with few physical assets (e.g. software or services) where high ROA may not fully reflect the company’s operational strength if driven by accounting artifacts or strategic underinvestment rather than true efficiency.

Accounting artifacts may include:

Strategic underinvestment could be high ROA achieved by delaying necessary capital expenditures (e.g. not upgrading machinery or software) thereby creating a questionable short-term boost while hurting long-term competitiveness. Similarly, aggressive inventory reduction can temporarily lower total assets and raise ROA at the risk of facing stockouts and lost future sales—both signaling hidden operational fragility.

According to some, another ROA flaw is division of net income (truly belongs only to equity holders) by total assets (funded by both debt and equity). A possible fix would be to use ROIC (see Part 2) or to add back interest expense in the numerator.

While 15–20% ROE is often considered strong, a “good” ROA is typically 5–10% with < 1% indicating financial weakness.

ROA is preferred by operational managers, lenders and regulators, and acquisition analysts because it evaluates how effectively internal resources are deployed, because it assesses fundamental operational soundness and asset quality, and because it provides an apples-to-apples comparison across companies with different levels of debt, respectively.

For equity investors, ROE is preferred because it focuses directly on the return generated for shareholders despite being easily inflated by increased debt (including share buybacks).

At the risk of sounding redundant, ROA provides a grounded view of how well a company uses its entire resource base–—both debt and equity—–to generate profit.

ROA is a good metric to determine whether managers are making good use of the company’s infrastructure and technology; consistent, high ROA indicates sustainable competitive advantage.

In summary, ROE describes how much the shareholders are making whereas ROA describes how well the business is running.

Understanding ROE (Part 3)

Today I want to return to Part 1 and give a couple examples using DuPont analysis (equation [1]).

Net profit margin, the first term, is calculated as follows. Top line of an income statement is revenue (i.e. sales). Subtract from that expenses such as SG&A (selling, general, and administrative costs), COGS (cost of goods sold) and other line items to get net income before taxes (i.e. pre-tax profit). Every income statement labels things differently but a general example is Item 8 here. Subtract taxes from pre-tax profit to get net income (i.e. profit). Divide profit by revenue and multiply by 100% to get profit margin (as a percentage).

The importance of net profit margin is clear, then. All else being equal, increasing profit margin will proportionally increase ROE. For example, if ROE is 12% and net profit margin is 6%, then increasing net profit margin to 10% will increase ROE to 20%. The same can be said for the second [asset turnover ratio] and third [financial leverage] terms.

Studying asset turnover ratio helps us understand the efficiency of asset use to generate sales. Higher ratio is better and means the company is less asset intensive. Assets can include stores, acquisitions, products, and markets. The key point to investigate is whether company is investing in new assets to grow future sales.

The financial leverage ratio reflects how well the company is using debt (borrowed money) to finance asset purchase to grow sales and earnings. Assets should increase future sales and earnings more than the cost of borrowing (i.e. interest).

Studying return on assets (ROA) rather than ROE can sometimes be advantageous. This shifts the focus from shareholder returns to operational efficiency, debt usage, and asset management. ROE measures how much profit a company makes with shareholders’ capital whereas ROA indicates how effectively management uses debt and equity to generate profit.

One big advantage of ROA over ROE is independence from financial leverage (debt). As mentioned in the Part 1 penultimate paragraph, higher leverage can boost ROE. ROA is less affected by a company’s capital structure. High ROE can make a company look profitable in these cases whereas its ROA can still reveal its assets are not generating high returns.

Stated another way, high ROE with low ROA indicates that a company is using high leverage to boost returns, which is riskier. ROA is superior for evaluating management’s ability to manage assets regardless of how those assets are financed.

ROA is best for asset-heavy industries. This includes industries with substantial capital investments such as utilities, telecommunications, and manufacturing.

ROA (or ROAA: return on average assets) is preferred when studying the banking sector to measure asset utilization and operational efficiency. Anything over 1.00% (1.25%) may be considered good (excellent).

I will continue next time.

Understanding ROE (Part 2)

Today I will delve deeper into Return on Equity (ROE) at the risk of offending some readers with some higher-level math and accounting concepts.

As discussed in Part 1, ROE is a primary indicator of a company’s profitability and management efficiency by measuring dollars of profit generated per dollar of shareholders’ equity:

Beware of potentially “bad things” that can mislead by resulting in a high ROE. The third term of (1) in Part 1 has shareholders’ equity in the denominator. Since that equals assets minus liabilities, taking on excessive debt minimizes this term thereby boosting ROE. Share buybacks reduce shareholders’ equity resulting in higher ROE even when net income remains flat. Large asset write-downs also reduce shareholders’ equity potentially inflating future ROE. Years of negative earnings can deplete shareholders’ equity thereby resulting in artificially high ROE noticed when profitability is finally realized.

Follow these tips to use ROE effectively. First, compare a stock against industry average because ROE can vary dramatically (e.g. tech companies often have higher ROE than asset-heavy utilities). Second, ensure ROE is sustainable by looking at a 5-10-year average and trend [stable or increasing is good] rather than single quarter. Third, DuPont Analysis [(1) in Part 1] is good to see what is driving the return. Finally, cross-referencing with return on invested capital (ROIC) can help understand if high ROE represents operational strength or just cheap debt.

ROIC = NOPAT / Invested Capital

In the numerator, NOPAT is Net Operating Profit After Tax and represents profit a company would have without debt or excess cash. NOPAT = EBIT * (1 – tax rate) where EBIT [may be substituted by operating income] is earnings before interest and taxes. NOPAT strips out the effects of leverage or different financing structures.

In the denominator, Invested Capital may be calculated two ways. The financing approach sums up the sources of capital: Total Equity + Total Debt – Cash & Equivalents, which simplifies to Total Equity + Net Debt. Alternatively, the operating approach focuses on assets used in operations: Total Assets – NIBCL. Non-Interest Bearing Current Liabilities (NIBCL) usually includes accounts payable and accrued expenses.

By ignoring how the business is funded, ROIC enables comparison of business quality—the ability to generate high returns on capital over a long period protected by a competitive advantage not easily disrupted by rivals—even if one is debt-free and the other is highly leveraged.

Bonus math for today: compare ROIC to Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for a true sense of value creation. If ROIC is 12% and WACC is 5%, then the company is creating 7% of value for every dollar it touches.

In reality, doing this comparison is not so simple. I would really make enemies today if I presented the WACC equation with its six different inputs. Many of these inputs are subjective and it’s not uncommon to have analyst disagreement up to 1.5%. While that may not impact the just-mentioned “true sense of value” so much, it’s also used as the discount rate in discounted cash flow models where a 1% WACC difference can change a stock’s intrinsic [or “fair”] value by 10-20%.

Please take a breather! If not for you, then take it for me.

Understanding ROE (Part 1)

Return on Equity (ROE) is a metric I have long since understood to be an important part of stock analysis. Outlier cases are what bring me to write about it today and I will get to those at the end of the mini-series. I will start by defining ROE and discussing why it’s worth studying.

ROE is a financial ratio measuring a company’s profitability (efficiency) by calculating net income per dollar of shareholders’ equity. This breaks down to the triple product of net profit margin, asset turnover ratio, and financial leverage:

Net Income * 100       Sales              Assets                   Net Income * 100
----------------  *  ---------  *  ----------------------   =   ----------------------  (1)
     Sales             Assets       Shareholders' Equity         Shareholders' Equity

Another way to calculate ROE = earnings per share / book value per share.

That ends the heavy math for today’s post.

Reasons to analyze ROE include:

When starting with an isolated look at ROE, over 15% is good and over 20% is exceptional. Look closer if it seems too good to be true. Also look closer if it’s [hugely] negative especially if profitability for the company seems acceptable.

After looking in isolation, evaluate ROE against peer and industry averages for more complete context. Net or pretax profit margin is another metric to compare with peers and the industry: comparatively higher is better.

As debt-to-equity can artificially inflate ROE, make sure to look at that too.

I will end here to keep my promise regarding the heavy math. Prepare for a longer post next time.