Understanding ROE (Part 4)
Posted by Mark on March 31, 2026 at 06:55 | Last modified: April 21, 2026 08:09I left off Part 3 discussing some reasons it may be useful to study return on assets (ROA) as an alternative to return on equity (ROE). Today I will conclude by comparing the two metrics.
With regard to the math, ROA is:
Net Income * 100
--------------------
Average Total Assets
Average Total Assets is the arithmetic mean between beginning and end of the year (or period). Note that ROE uses only shareholder equity in the denominator of its calculation.
ROA can mislead for companies with few physical assets (e.g. software or services) where high ROA may not fully reflect the company’s operational strength if driven by accounting artifacts or strategic underinvestment rather than true efficiency.
Accounting artifacts may include:
- Fully-depreciated [older] assets having a lower book value on the balance sheet thereby shrinking the denominator and artificially inflating ROA despite equipment being potentially inefficient or nearing its end.
- Ignoring off-balance-sheet assets like brand value, patents, or intellectual property that would otherwise lower ROA.
- A temporary spike in net income from non-recurring items (e.g. selling a subsidiary or a large asset write-down) that may make a company appear more efficient in a single period than it actually is.
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Strategic underinvestment could be high ROA achieved by delaying necessary capital expenditures (e.g. not upgrading machinery or software) thereby creating a questionable short-term boost while hurting long-term competitiveness. Similarly, aggressive inventory reduction can temporarily lower total assets and raise ROA at the risk of facing stockouts and lost future sales—both signaling hidden operational fragility.
According to some, another ROA flaw is division of net income (truly belongs only to equity holders) by total assets (funded by both debt and equity). A possible fix would be to use ROIC (see Part 2) or to add back interest expense in the numerator.
While 15–20% ROE is often considered strong, a “good” ROA is typically 5–10% with < 1% indicating financial weakness.
ROA is preferred by operational managers, lenders and regulators, and acquisition analysts because it evaluates how effectively internal resources are deployed, because it assesses fundamental operational soundness and asset quality, and because it provides an apples-to-apples comparison across companies with different levels of debt, respectively.
For equity investors, ROE is preferred because it focuses directly on the return generated for shareholders despite being easily inflated by increased debt (including share buybacks).
At the risk of sounding redundant, ROA provides a grounded view of how well a company uses its entire resource base–—both debt and equity—–to generate profit.
ROA is a good metric to determine whether managers are making good use of the company’s infrastructure and technology; consistent, high ROA indicates sustainable competitive advantage.
In summary, ROE describes how much the shareholders are making whereas ROA describes how well the business is running.
Categories: Financial Literacy | Comments (0) | PermalinkUnderstanding ROE (Part 3)
Posted by Mark on March 26, 2026 at 07:34 | Last modified: April 13, 2026 08:20Today I want to return to Part 1 and give a couple examples using DuPont analysis (equation [1]).
Net profit margin, the first term, is calculated as follows. Top line of an income statement is revenue (i.e. sales). Subtract from that expenses such as SG&A (selling, general, and administrative costs), COGS (cost of goods sold) and other line items to get net income before taxes (i.e. pre-tax profit). Every income statement labels things differently but a general example is Item 8 here. Subtract taxes from pre-tax profit to get net income (i.e. profit). Divide profit by revenue and multiply by 100% to get profit margin (as a percentage).
The importance of net profit margin is clear, then. All else being equal, increasing profit margin will proportionally increase ROE. For example, if ROE is 12% and net profit margin is 6%, then increasing net profit margin to 10% will increase ROE to 20%. The same can be said for the second [asset turnover ratio] and third [financial leverage] terms.
Studying asset turnover ratio helps us understand the efficiency of asset use to generate sales. Higher ratio is better and means the company is less asset intensive. Assets can include stores, acquisitions, products, and markets. The key point to investigate is whether company is investing in new assets to grow future sales.
The financial leverage ratio reflects how well the company is using debt (borrowed money) to finance asset purchase to grow sales and earnings. Assets should increase future sales and earnings more than the cost of borrowing (i.e. interest).
Studying return on assets (ROA) rather than ROE can sometimes be advantageous. This shifts the focus from shareholder returns to operational efficiency, debt usage, and asset management. ROE measures how much profit a company makes with shareholders’ capital whereas ROA indicates how effectively management uses debt and equity to generate profit.
One big advantage of ROA over ROE is independence from financial leverage (debt). As mentioned in the Part 1 penultimate paragraph, higher leverage can boost ROE. ROA is less affected by a company’s capital structure. High ROE can make a company look profitable in these cases whereas its ROA can still reveal its assets are not generating high returns.
Stated another way, high ROE with low ROA indicates that a company is using high leverage to boost returns, which is riskier. ROA is superior for evaluating management’s ability to manage assets regardless of how those assets are financed.
ROA is best for asset-heavy industries. This includes industries with substantial capital investments such as utilities, telecommunications, and manufacturing.
ROA (or ROAA: return on average assets) is preferred when studying the banking sector to measure asset utilization and operational efficiency. Anything over 1.00% (1.25%) may be considered good (excellent).
I will continue next time.
Categories: Financial Literacy | Comments (0) | PermalinkUnderstanding ROE (Part 2)
Posted by Mark on March 23, 2026 at 07:30 | Last modified: April 13, 2026 07:43Today I will delve deeper into Return on Equity (ROE) at the risk of offending some readers with some higher-level math and accounting concepts.
As discussed in Part 1, ROE is a primary indicator of a company’s profitability and management efficiency by measuring dollars of profit generated per dollar of shareholders’ equity:
- High or rising ROE suggests management is efficiently using shareholder capital to generate earnings.
- Consistently high ROE (e.g. 15-20%+) often signifies a strong economic moat or superior business model.
- ROE may be used to determine a company’s sustainable growth rate by calculating the pace a company can grow internally generated profits.
- ROE allows investors to compare corporate performance within the same industry.
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Beware of potentially “bad things” that can mislead by resulting in a high ROE. The third term of (1) in Part 1 has shareholders’ equity in the denominator. Since that equals assets minus liabilities, taking on excessive debt minimizes this term thereby boosting ROE. Share buybacks reduce shareholders’ equity resulting in higher ROE even when net income remains flat. Large asset write-downs also reduce shareholders’ equity potentially inflating future ROE. Years of negative earnings can deplete shareholders’ equity thereby resulting in artificially high ROE noticed when profitability is finally realized.
Follow these tips to use ROE effectively. First, compare a stock against industry average because ROE can vary dramatically (e.g. tech companies often have higher ROE than asset-heavy utilities). Second, ensure ROE is sustainable by looking at a 5-10-year average and trend [stable or increasing is good] rather than single quarter. Third, DuPont Analysis [(1) in Part 1] is good to see what is driving the return. Finally, cross-referencing with return on invested capital (ROIC) can help understand if high ROE represents operational strength or just cheap debt.
ROIC = NOPAT / Invested Capital
In the numerator, NOPAT is Net Operating Profit After Tax and represents profit a company would have without debt or excess cash. NOPAT = EBIT * (1 – tax rate) where EBIT [may be substituted by operating income] is earnings before interest and taxes. NOPAT strips out the effects of leverage or different financing structures.
In the denominator, Invested Capital may be calculated two ways. The financing approach sums up the sources of capital: Total Equity + Total Debt – Cash & Equivalents, which simplifies to Total Equity + Net Debt. Alternatively, the operating approach focuses on assets used in operations: Total Assets – NIBCL. Non-Interest Bearing Current Liabilities (NIBCL) usually includes accounts payable and accrued expenses.
By ignoring how the business is funded, ROIC enables comparison of business quality—the ability to generate high returns on capital over a long period protected by a competitive advantage not easily disrupted by rivals—even if one is debt-free and the other is highly leveraged.
Bonus math for today: compare ROIC to Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for a true sense of value creation. If ROIC is 12% and WACC is 5%, then the company is creating 7% of value for every dollar it touches.
In reality, doing this comparison is not so simple. I would really make enemies today if I presented the WACC equation with its six different inputs. Many of these inputs are subjective and it’s not uncommon to have analyst disagreement up to 1.5%. While that may not impact the just-mentioned “true sense of value” so much, it’s also used as the discount rate in discounted cash flow models where a 1% WACC difference can change a stock’s intrinsic [or “fair”] value by 10-20%.
Please take a breather! If not for you, then take it for me.
Categories: Financial Literacy | Comments (0) | PermalinkUnderstanding ROE (Part 1)
Posted by Mark on March 19, 2026 at 07:37 | Last modified: March 26, 2026 09:04Return on Equity (ROE) is a metric I have long since understood to be an important part of stock analysis. Outlier cases are what bring me to write about it today and I will get to those at the end of the mini-series. I will start by defining ROE and discussing why it’s worth studying.
ROE is a financial ratio measuring a company’s profitability (efficiency) by calculating net income per dollar of shareholders’ equity. This breaks down to the triple product of net profit margin, asset turnover ratio, and financial leverage:
Net Income * 100SalesAssetsNet Income * 100 ---------------- * --------- * ---------------------- = ---------------------- (1)SalesAssetsShareholders' Equity Shareholders' Equity
Another way to calculate ROE = earnings per share / book value per share.
That ends the heavy math for today’s post.
Reasons to analyze ROE include:
- To show how effectively management uses investors’ money to produce earnings: a high ROE often suggests competitive advantage (per Investopedia).
- To compare profitability between companies within the same industry (per TD Bank).
- To indicate potential growth as companies with consistently high ROE are able to reinvest profits for growth rather than having to take on more debt or issue more shares.
- To evaluate management quality as consistently high ROE is a sign of strong, efficient management (per SmartAsset).
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When starting with an isolated look at ROE, over 15% is good and over 20% is exceptional. Look closer if it seems too good to be true. Also look closer if it’s [hugely] negative especially if profitability for the company seems acceptable.
After looking in isolation, evaluate ROE against peer and industry averages for more complete context. Net or pretax profit margin is another metric to compare with peers and the industry: comparatively higher is better.
As debt-to-equity can artificially inflate ROE, make sure to look at that too.
I will end here to keep my promise regarding the heavy math. Prepare for a longer post next time.
Categories: Financial Literacy | Comments (2) | PermalinkMSFT Stock Study (3-15-26)
Posted by Mark on March 16, 2026 at 07:16 | Last modified: March 15, 2026 10:42I recently did a stock study on Microsoft Corp. (MSFT, $395.55).
M* writes:
> Microsoft develops and licenses consumer and enterprise
> software. It is known for its Windows operating systems
> and Office productivity suite. The company is organized
> into three equally sized broad segments: productivity
> and business processes (legacy Microsoft Office, cloud-
> based Office 365, Exchange, SharePoint, Skype, LinkedIn,
> Dynamics), intelligence cloud (infrastructure- and
> platform-as-a-service offerings Azure, Windows Server
> OS, SQL Server), and more personal computing
> (Windows Client, Xbox, Bing search, display advertising,
> and Surface laptops, tablets, and desktops).
Over the past decade, this mega-size ( > $100B annual revenue) company grows sales and EPS at annualized rates of 14.6% and 25.1%, respectively (FY ends Jun 30). Lines are up, straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 100. Shares outstanding decrease 6.8% (0.8%/year).
Over the past decade, PTPM trails peer and industry averages while increasing from 23.1% to 43.9% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 42.9%. ROE is roughly even with peer and industry averages while ranging from 21.9% in ’16 to 45.0% in ’21 with a last-5-year mean of 38.5%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages while falling from 42.7% to 15.0% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 23.3%.
Quick Ratio is 1.12 and Interest Coverage 56.4 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and an A grade for Financial Health (per BetterInvesting® website). VL gives an A++ rating for Financial Strength.
With regard to sales growth:
- YF gives YOY ACE 16.4% and 15.4% for ’26 and ’27 (based on 48 analysts).
- Zacks gives YOY ACE 16.1% and 14.4% for ’26 and ’27, respectively (17 analysts).
- VL gives 6.3% per year from ’24-’29.
- CFRA projects 16.4% YOY and 15.6% per year for ’26 and ’25-’27, respectively.
- M* gives 2-year ACE of 15.9% per year and projects 5-year annualized 11.4% in Equity Report.
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I am forecasting below the range at 6.0% per year.
With regard to EPS growth:
- MarketWatch gives ACE 16.5% and 18.8% per year for ’25-’27 and ’25-’28, respectively (based on 60 analysts).
- Nasdaq.com gives ACE 15.5% and 15.9% per year for ’26-’28 and ’26-’29 [13 / 7 / 1 analyst(s) for ’26 / ’28 / ’29].
- Seeking Alpha projects 4-year annualized of 13.5%.
- Finviz gives ACE 5-year annualized of 18.2% (14).
- Argus gives 5-year annualized of 12.0%.
- LSEG projects LTG of 16.0%.
- YF gives YOY ACE 22.7% and 12.6% for ’26 and ’27, respectively (30).
- Zacks gives YOY ACE 24.4% and 10.4% for ’26 and ’27, respectively, and 5-year annualized of 15.6% (18).
- VL gives 11.0% annualized from ’24-’29.
- CFRA projects 18.5% YOY and 17.7% per year for ’26 and ’25-’27 along with 3-year CAGR of 15.0%.
- M* gives ACE long-term 15.1%/year and projects 16.9% annualized from ’24-’29 in Equity Report.
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My 11.0% forecast is at bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 14.8%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $13.64/share rather than 2026 Q2 $15.99 (TTM).
My Forecast High P/E is 30.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E ranges from 26.9 in ’17 to to 38.7 in ’24 (excluding upside outlier of 48.2 in ’18) with a last-5-year mean of 36.3 and last-5-year-mean average P/E of 30.5 (also excluding upside low P/E outlier in ’18). I am below the latter.
My Forecast Low P/E is 21.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E increases from 18.9 to 25.3 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 24.6. I am forecasting the lowest since 2019.
My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $286.50 is based on initial value from above. This is 27.6% less than previous close and 16.9% less than 52-week low.
Over the past 10 years, Payout Ratio (PR) falls from 66.2% to 23.8% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 25.7%. I am forecasting below the range at 23.0%.
These inputs land MSFT in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.7. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 12.5%.
PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 9.1% is decent for a mega-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.
To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 711 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 238 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 13.5%, 13.1%, 33.0, 23.6, and 25.7% respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 34.0 that is much greater than MS (28.3) and greater than mine (25.5).
MS high / low EPS are $28.25 / $14.66 versus my $22.98 / $13.64 (per share). My high EPS is less mainly due to a lower growth rate. VL (M*) high EPS of $23.00 ($25.46) is in the middle.
MS LSPF of $333.20 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 22.7: less than the above-stated 23.6. MS LSPF is 3.7% less than the default $14.66/share * 23.6 = $345.98 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF exceeds mine by 16.3%, however.
MOS is robust in the study because my growth rates are less than or at the bottom of historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges. A P/E disconnect seems to occur in 2020 and my forecast P/E numbers are below those of 2020 and beyond. Also supportive of the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 5.5% per year and my substantially lower LSPF.
Regarding valuation, PEG is 1.5 and 2.0 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: slightly high, perhaps (M* has 1.3). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is low at 0.81. M* has stock trading at a 34% discount while “Quick and Dirty” DCF method perplexingly has stock overvalued by 40% due to heavy future CapEx projections.
Per U/D, MSFT is a BUY under $387/share. BetterInvesting® TAR criterion would be met [689.4 / ((14.07 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5]
~ $357 given a forecast high price ~$689.
A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).
Categories: BetterInvesting® | Comments (0) | PermalinkThe Revenge Trade
Posted by Mark on November 6, 2025 at 07:16 | Last modified: April 9, 2026 07:53I mentioned revenge trading in the the sixth paragraph of [Epic Fury] Part 9. Today I want to fully discuss the concept.
Google AI defines revenge trading as an impulsive, emotionally driven behavior where one attempts to quickly recover from a significant loss by entering new, often larger, trades without a clear strategy. The behavior is frequently compared to going “on tilt” in poker, where frustration replaces logic and leads to reckless decision-making.
Breaking it down further, revenge trading:
- Is motivated by anger, fear, or a desire to “beat the market” rather than objective analysis.
- Increases risk by doubling or tripling position size to recoup losses faster.
- Involves taking consecutive, “rapid-fire” trades without waiting for valid setups.
- Typically ignores predefined risk management such as stop-losses and trade plans.
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Psychologically, revenge trading may occur for a few different reasons:
- Pain of loss may be felt twice as strongly as joy of equivalent gain creating urgent biological need to “fix” the situation.
- Ego leads traders to feel personally slighted by the market with a subsequent desire to prove being “right” rather than admitting a mistake.
- Gambler’s fallacy is the mistaken belief that a big win is “due” after several losses.
- The illusion of control means taking any action, even a poor one, feels better than sitting helpless with a loss.
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If revenge trading becomes a continuing problem, then the trading plan should be altered to prevent it. Incorporate mandatory cooldowns by physically walking away from the screen after a loss to reset the mind. Institute daily loss limits where action is halted after reaching a specific dollar loss or number of [consecutive] losing trades.
Journaling can help by tracking emotions felt during revenge trading to identify personal triggers. In thoughts and writing, make an effort to shift focus away from daily PnL to strict trade plan adherence. As with sports, sometimes the other team is just better that day but sticking with a well-thought-out plan puts the probabilities in your favor.
I believe this was my version of revenge trading. I don’t feel slighted or angry, per se. I do feel a need to act quickly and get on with a new plan that will recoup the losses and maintain the gradually upsloping equity curve. I don’t really think so much—it just becomes my [automated] mission in the moment and I may not process all relevant details (e.g. ignoring the red flags discussed in Parts 9 and 10) before moving forward.
The current instance of revenge trading robbed me of the volatility opportunity discussed in Part 7’s fifth paragraph.
Categories: Option Trading | Comments (0) | PermalinkTrading Epic Fury (Part 11)
Posted by Mark on November 3, 2025 at 07:37 | Last modified: April 7, 2026 08:59Today I want to tie up a couple loose ends from Part 9.
In the fourth paragraph, I said “’last thing I expected’ events happening on an all-too-frequent basis are one thing that make trading difficult.” As improbable as that one-day rally was, any number of such improbable events could have also caused large losses and the chance of encountering one of many is not so small. This likely explains why unexpected events seem all too frequent: they actually are.
Mar 31 actually wasn’t as improbable as I initially thought. The index rallied 2.91%. The previous VIX level of 30.61 equates to an expected move of 1.93% making for a 1.51 standard deviation (SD) move on the day. The probability of 1.51 SD is 6.55% or about once every three weeks. If I were contemplating potential market moves for the next day, then I should cover at least 2 SD, which has a roughly 4.6% chance to occur (2.3% up and 2.3% down).
If “last-thing-I-expected” events seem to be common, then events I should expect more are really no surprise.
One thing not currently part of my routine is a “fire drill” for the next trading day. Using modeling software, the fire drill can expose potential vulnerabilities by looking at changes in profit/loss based on extreme moves. One approach is to look up and down 2 SD on the index with volatility 10 points lower and higher, respectively. If either results in a loss beyond my risk tolerance, then consider making a preemptive adjustment today to prevent a disruptive result tomorrow.
Incorporating a fire drill would change my EOD trading checklist but is definitely worthy of consideration.
I want to revisit the first red flag from Part 9. I saw the extreme gamma and thought “but it’s really just for one trading day.”
Believing I can sneak something past Mr. Market is foolish because it’s never just me thinking that way. Although debatable, it is my opinion from the past 18 years that no ideas are new ideas. Certainly anything I come up with is not going to be unique to the countless trading participants across time and space. If many are thinking the same way, then it’s logical to believe contrarians will also notice and attempt to profit. That can be a threat.
Bottom line: don’t feel emboldened by a short time. It’s much more difficult when others are thinking the same thing.
I may sound like a conspiracy theorist with all this. Whether true or not, one thing I know is that it did not work on Mar 31.
Next time I will talk about Mar 30 and revenge trading.
Categories: Accountability | Comments (0) | PermalinkTrading Epic Fury (Part 10)
Posted by Mark on October 31, 2025 at 07:14 | Last modified: April 6, 2026 17:04Today I will continue Part 9 discussing red flags ignored when making trades detailed in (3) from Part 7.
The fourth final red flag was being inadequately prepared for the Good Friday holiday week. Per Google AI:
> There is a distinct seasonal tendency for the stock market to be bullish during
> the week leading up to Good Friday, with a high probability of gains in the days
> before. The market often shows positive performance in the days leading up to
> the holiday, with Holy Thursday showing particularly high average returns.
I’ve never been completely sold on market seasonality due to limited sample size. I acknowledge the [at least] urban legend as probably enough of a possibility that I shouldn’t take any extreme risk. That’s kinda what I did on Mar 30.
In isolation, I wouldn’t say the final red flag was sufficient reason to do something different. I probably would have been fine with a 3% market rally on the week rather than the day. The presence of multiple red flags is better reason to second-guess.
Going forward, potential daily trading checklist items include:
- Are my greeks within normal limits after execution of the proposed trades?
- Is the market in a crash environment (this third indicator may be sufficient).
- Are any seasonal conditions present?
- Is this a holiday week?
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Some clarification is needed for the hope indicator from Part 9 paragraph 5. What I would like the market to do on any given day and what I need the market to do are two different things. I may never want to see things like a Black Swan but hoping to avoid one does not trigger the hope indicator. I’m more concerned about hoping to avoid normal market activity that may substantially hurt me. On the flipside, if I need outlier events to avoid large losses then the indicator is also triggered.
It may be that hardly a day goes by I don’t hope for something. This argument seems weak, however, because on most days I truly don’t care what the market does. One reason is because I don’t aim to profit every day. I hope to show gradual profit over time in the face of expected intermittent losses. Maybe I also hope to profit on a higher percentage of days than the market climbs [which hasn’t even been tested so maybe it’s not an actual desire of mine].
Upon further review, I don’t believe the hope indicator triggered on Mar 30. Logging in to see -1800 with big losses are what forced me to make such a drastic Mar 31 upside adjustment. Had the market rallied 1% then maybe I roll up and out with a trimming of upside exposure and little discussion ensues.
I will continue next time.
Categories: Accountability | Comments (1) | PermalinkTrading Epic Fury (Part 9)
Posted by Mark on October 28, 2025 at 06:39 | Last modified: April 9, 2026 06:50The previous adjustments detailed at bottom of Part 7 proved unfortunate.
Trading on the final day of Q1 (one week ago) brings the following for SPX and VIX, respectively (circled candles):
SPX rallies 2.9% and VIX falls 5.3 points (~17.5%). I lost 2.4% for a daily relative return of -5.3%. That hurts.
Going back to Part 7, (3) really did me in. Before checking the market on March 31 near EOD, I shuddered in thinking about -100 x number of short calls being my total potential upside delta exposure as described in paragraph 3 [albeit there talking about downside exposure]. The last thing I anticipated was a huge rally just then but “last-thing-I-expected” events happening on an all-too-frequent basis are one thing that make trading difficult.
With the dramatic increase in calls, my hope was for them to be gone within a couple trading days. Once again, I violated this final indicator. Hope is not a strategy. Once I begin hoping then I seriously open myself up to disaster.
It’s sometimes very difficult to walk away from big losses like the -3.1% discussed here. Failing to do so risks revenge trading. I will save that topic for another day, but this was a perfect illustration [and suggestive of another useful addition to the incident report checklist: “am I susceptible to revenge trading today?”].
I ignored a few different red flags in doubling short call exposure on March 30.
The first red flag was a doubling of gamma to levels previous unseen (in the brief month that I have so far been tracking daily greeks). This was necessary to cut position delta and restore TD to triple digits thereby leaving me able to sleep at night [selling more to get negative delta as suggested in Part 7 last paragraph then the day could have absolutely been a knockout blow]. It just doesn’t seem like a great solution especially in retrospect.
The second red flag was an oversold market. SPX RSI(2) < 10, RSI(4) < 10, and SPX price < lower BB for two consecutive days. Technical analysis is no guarantee [and recall the Keynes quote from Part 5 paragraph 3] but eventually one is really “tempting fate.” It’s known that some of the biggest up days in stock market history occur during sharp downturns or bear markets [but we’re not technically in a bear market so moving on]…
A third red flag was March 31. Final days of March are frequently bullish—per Google AI—and often driven by quarter-end portfolio rebalancing and window dressing. March is seasonally weak but final days can see a relief rally as funds adjust positions to reflect better performance for the end of the first quarter. “Window dressing” pertains to institutional portfolio managers buying (selling) top- (under-) performing stocks on the last day of the quarter to make holdings appear more robust in subsequent reports. Also with March weak, the 31st can see a surge due to short covering (investors covering bearish bets).
I will continue next time.
Categories: Accountability | Comments (3) | PermalinkTrading Epic Fury (Part 8)
Posted by Mark on October 23, 2025 at 07:05 | Last modified: March 31, 2026 13:32Today I want to tie up a couple loose ends from Part 5.
Having been that way for three weeks, I expected the rangebound market to continue on Friday but EOD had us at multi-month lows on SPX (and under the 200-SMA) and multi-month highs on VIX.
Going back to the first bullet point in Part 5, volatility can indeed continue to climb and go much higher. During the COVID-19 Pandemic (March 2020), VIX hit its all-time record closing high of 82.7. During the Global Financial Crisis, VIX reached its all-time intraday high of 89.5 in Oct 2008. In Nov 2008, VIX recorded a closing high of 80.9 on the 20th.
Despite these harrowing numbers, my personal break point would be much closer because the mental toll levied by days like Friday is real. I was scurring about like the proverbial chicken with its head cut off to check relevant charts, to determine what contracts to close/adjust, and to work trades by 4:00 PM not to mention recording everything on my spreadsheets. I even made a trading error that cost me dearly [review to determine how better to utilize the confirmation screen]. When it’s all over, I close my eyes and take some deep breaths. I sometimes stare at the screen for several minutes and zone out. The short-term stress of losing big money has a cumulative effect. A couple more may have me ready to throw in the towel: usually at the worst possible time landing me with catastrophic loss (third-to-last paragraph here and third paragraph here).
Trading as a psychological game is a whole separate topic but I’ve listed a few things that affected me Friday and caused some poor decision making: high position delta, big losses, big market moves, and multi-month extreme market levels.
A couple supportive factors were available, though. I discussed in Part 6 how Friday’s volatility Friday wasn’t actually too bad. Realizing that may have helped to calm me a bit. Also, while known as a key psychological indicator the 200-SMA is historically a long-term bullish signal: something else to realize for the sake of remaining calm.
Big picture goal may be to protect myself when volatility is high by staying closer to delta neutral as discussed in the Part 7 penultimate paragraph.
Despite discussion about needing to exit and to continue reducing downside exposure [i.e. Part 7 paragraph 4 and (1)], I did open a couple puts last week. These puts are closer-dated to take advantage of VIX backwardation (IV and DTE inversely proportional), which I think at least makes good logical sense.
Categories: Accountability | Comments (0) | Permalink
